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System reliability analysis is an essential element is the design process. A 
reliability study should proceed from system inception through final deployment. As the 
PANSAT project approaches the final design stage and begins initial flight production, 
the absence of any significant reliability analysis becomes increasingly troubling. This 
thesis initiates the program's reliability analysis obligation by investigating spacecraft 
failure modes. Typically referenced as critical failure modes, these events will cause 
complete and permanent system failure. A reliability analysis tool, called Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), is used to conduct a systematic review of current hardware design 
architecture to expose potential critical failure points or weak links. 
The analytical result is a Boolean logic tree that describes critical failure events and 
all the potential causes. This causal output relationship describes each component failure 
(i.e., single point failures), or component failure combinations (i.e., multi-point failures), 
which could cause the undesirable failure event, or Top Event. The fault tree will provide 
design engineers and management personnel with an effective tool and reference point 
from which to implement design modifications to circumvent potential problems. 
VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION   1 
A. PANSAT OVERVIEW  1 
1. Purpose   1 
a. Engineering   1 
b. Operation  2 
2. Mission Overview 2 
A. Concept Of Operations 2 
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE   3 
1. Purpose   4 
2. Concurrent Engineering Concept  4 
3. Scope Of Thesis   5 
a. Problem Statement 5 
b. Research Questions   6 
C. THESIS STRUCTURE  6 
II. PANSAT BACKGROUND 9 
A. DEVELOPMENT 9 
B. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 9 
1. Hardware Architecture 9 
a. Structure 9 
b. Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS)    11 
c. Thermal Control      14 
d. Digital Control Subsystem (DCS)        14 
e. Communication (COMM) Subsystem     16 
2. Software Architecture      18 
a. Operating System Structure      18 
b. Link Layered Protocol    19 
c. Spacecraft Commanding    20 
3. Ground Station    20 
C. PROGRAM LIFE-CYCLE    21 
1. Mission Duration    21 
2. Launch Options     21 
a. Hitchhiker Program      21 
VII 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
b. Minuteman  22 
III. RELIABILITY 23 
A. Reliability Analysis Background  23 
1. Stages Of Systems Analysis     23 
a. Inductive  23 
b. Deductive     23 
2. Phased Mission Profiles  24 
a. Launch And Initialization   24 
b. Operations    25 
B. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION    25 
1. Historical Background  26 
2. Fault Tree Analysis Utility    26 
a. Advantages  26 
b. Disadvantages   27 
c. Assumptions    28 
C. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT        29 
1. Structure Function  29 
a. Notation    29 
b. Series Structure  31 
c. Parallel Structure  31 
2. Component Relevance  32 
3. Coherent Systems    32 
4. Minimal Path and Minimal Cut Sets  33 
a. Minimal Path Sets    33 
b. Minimum Cut Sets  34 
5. Importance    35 
6. Reliability Function    36 
7. Association  37 
8. Special Structure System (k-out-of-n)    38 
D. FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION   40 
1. Methodology    40 
a. Symbology   41 
VIM 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
b. Event Classifications  43 
2. Fault Tree Synthesis   44 
E. FAULT TREE EXAMPLE  44 
1. Cut set notation    45 
2. Path set notation    46 
3. Fault Tree Model  47 
IV. PANSAT FAULT TREE ANALYSIS  51 
A. EPS    52 
1. Minimum Cut Sets    52 
2. Single Point Failures    53 
a. +5 Volt Power Supply   54 
b. Peripheral Control Bus (PCB)   54 
c. Solar Panels   55 
d. Control Signals   56 
e. EPS Logic Board    56 
f. Thermal Control    57 
g. Battery Monitor  58 
3. Double Point Failures    58 
a. Launch Switches  58 
b. Battery    58 
c. WDT   59 
4. Triple Point Failures  61 
a. Solar Panels   61 
b. Battery    61 
5. Quadruple Point Failures  61 
a. Battery  61 
6. Improvements    62 
a. Launch Switches  62 
b. Blocking Diodes  65 
c. Power Switching Control Circuits    65 
d. Antenna Deployment Circuitry   66 
e. Solar Panel Wiring And Fusing  66 
IX 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
f. Power Switch Fusing   67 
g. +5 Volt Power Supply  67 
h. PCB  67 
i. WDT    67 
j. Battery   68 
B. RF    68 
1. Minimum Cut Sets      68 
2. Single Point Failures      69 
a. Signal Routing Switches  69 
b. Antenna    70 
c. Power Supply    70 
3. Double Point Failures  70 
a. Antenna Deployment    70 
b. Amplifiers      71 
c. Intermediate Frequency (IF) Circuits      71 
4. Improvements      71 
C. DCS      71 
V. SUMMARY     73 
A. SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS     73 
B. SYSTEM RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT    74 
C. FOLLOW ON STUDY      75 
APPENDIX A. EPS FAULT TREE ANALYSIS    77 
APPENDIX B. RF SUBSYSTEM    103 
APPENDIX C. DIGITAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM    117 
APPENDIX D. PANSAT FAULT TREE   127 
LIST OF REFERENCES    161 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST   163 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A.     PANSAT OVERVIEW 
The Petite Amateur Navy Satellite (PANSAT) is a small satellite being designed, 
fabricated, and eventually operated by faculty and students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS). Primarily a project of the Space Systems Academic Group (SSAG), it 
combines the efforts and expertise of staff and students of various departments. These 
include the Departments of Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering, Electrical and 
Computer Engineering, and Computer Science. The spacecraft will provide amateur 
radio enthusiasts a new space communication medium utilizing spread spectrum 
modulation for radio packet switching. It also provides a platform for evaluating the use 
of spread spectrum in reducing frequency band congestion. 
The design, development, and deployment of the satellite is integrated in a 
coordinated manner by the SSAG engineering staff and master's candidate students at 
NPS. The student contributions are primarily through thesis, class, or individual projects 
as well as directed study courses. The faculty provides the necessary expertise and 
direction to assist in project and thesis advisement and consultation. 
1. Purpose 
The primary purpose of the PANSAT project is to provide a practical hands-on 
experience for NPS students in the Space Systems Operations and the Space Systems 
Engineering curriculums. Military communication applications employ spread spectrum 
techniques primarily to achieve anti-jam and security objectives. PANSAT provides the 
officer student with practical hands-on experience for future applications of this 
technology. 
a. Engineering 
The engineering experiences provided by PANSAT allow students of various 
core engineering factions the opportunity to apply basic principles, coupled with creative 
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thought processes, to a wide variety of engineering problems inherent to the design and 
fabrication of a spacecraft. The student is able to experience the spacecraft development 
process from conceptual design through fabrication, testing, launch integration and 
deployment stages. 
b. Operation 
Students of the Space Systems Operation curriculum benefit from the 
opportunity to experience a wide variety of aspects of space system acquisition and 
operation that would not normally be made available in an academic environment. The 
PANSAT program provides a creative medium to explore new and exciting concepts 
from mission planning, requirements definition, and design reviews through spacecraft 
launch, initialization, and mission operations. This provides a valuable background to the 
student in future assignments as program sponsors, project managers, or operational 
supervisors. 
2. Mission Overview 
The mission of the PANSAT spacecraft will be to carry a communications payload 
that exploits the amateur radio community's 70 centimeter band. The implementation of a 
communication link which spreads a differentially coded binary phase shift keyed 
(BPSK) signal utilizing the direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) technique, is an 
element of the PANSAT design which makes it unique from other spacecraft that employ 
radio packet switching communications. 
a. Concept of Operations 
Developed as a small, about 150 pounds, spread spectrum communications 
satellite for officer students at NPS as an educational project, PANSAT will be launched 
into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) from the Space Shuttle via the Hitchhiker program. The 
capability to launch the spacecraft from a refurbished Minuteman missile is under 
investigation as an alternate launch platform. 
The exact orbital parameters of the spacecraft are not yet known, it is expected 
however to operate in a circular orbit at an orbital altitude of approximately 200 nautical 
miles, with an inclination of between 28.5 and 51.6 degrees. Amateur radio ground 
stations will be able to access PANSAT to utilize its capabilities as a orbiting e-mail 
server providing store and forward packet file transfer (Fig. 1) between terrestrial users. 
Packet switching, utilizing the amateur radio community's packet switching protocol 
(AX.25) will be used as the networking protocol between the ground station and the 
spacecraft. 
W Station «2 
waits to 
racieve 
Figure 1. Store and Forward Concept [Ref. 1] 
The PANSAT design objective was to minimize cost and complexity, this in 
turn fostered creativity and resourcefulness. The absence of Guidance Navigation and 
Control (attitude control), Thermal Control (active), and Propulsion subsystems created 
unique issues to be addressed by the design engineers. With orbital attitude that has been 
commonly referred to as "tumbling", the spacecraft employs distinctive antenna design 
characteristics to help ensure the communications payload will be consistently in contact 
with visible ground stations. 
B.     THESIS OBJECTIVE 
In the most general terms, the reliability of a system can be described as the 
probability a system will remain operational or maintain it's ability to complete its design 
mission objective for a given period of time under given environmental conditions. The 
applications of the reliability analysis field and methods used to evaluate them are 
extensive. This thesis will explore the application of one such method, called Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), to critically evaluate the PANSAT design. 
1. Purpose 
Reliability analysis of a system can be accomplished utilizing various analysis 
methods.   A particular analytical method may be more applicable to a particular design 
state than another during the project's life-cycle. To date no detailed reliability analysis 
has been conducted, prefacing an unquestionable need to perform a subjective study. The 
identification of potential failure modes prior to the critical design review, and 
commencement of flight hardware production, is essential to ensure fulfillment of the 
mission life requirement. 
2. Concurrent Engineering Concept 
The idea of concurrent engineering, or the practice of incorporating various 
life-cycle values into the early stages of design, is one that has gained an increasingly 
popular following, particularly in the climate of shrinking fiscal budgets. The process of 
designing for reliability is an element of the process that is receiving a great deal of 
attention. Particularly in systems, like satellites, where system repair is next to 
impossible once the system is placed into operation, the concern for a reliable system by 
all levels of management is at the forefront of the design process (Fig. 2). 
Principally an organizational and managerial challenge, concurrent engineering 
concepts are particularly important in the early stages of program development. 
Traditionally, reliability budgeting begins in the concept phase and reliability verification 
continues throughout the project development cycle. 
A cursory study of the project design may lead a program manager or design 
engineer to believe the system is very robust due to the built in redundancy of the design 
architecture. A detailed study may reveal inherent weak points that could aggravate the 
true system reliability. 
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3. Scope of Thesis 
This thesis will analyze the critical hardware failure modes of the PANS AT 
hardware architecture by utilizing an analysis tool called Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
Critical failure is summarized as those failures which lead to an inoperable and 
unrecoverable failure of essential mission components that leave the system inoperable. 
This can occur at any time within the systems lifetime. 
Although not immediately apparent, a reliability study for a project which is as 
relatively small and seemingly simple as the PANSAT design, can quickly become 
complex and increasingly time consuming. 
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Figure 2. Cost or System Effectiveness Assurance Structure [Ref. 2] 
a. Problem Statement 
A detailed reliability study of the PANSAT project has not been conducted to 
this point, so this thesis will be a first cut analysis of the current design status. The 
majority of the critical failure analysis will focus on an analysis of the Electrical Power 
Subsystem (EPS), with a minor look at the Digital Control Subsystem (DCS) and the 
Communications Subsystem (COMM) payload. The incomplete design status, 
particularly low level design considerations, of various subsystems (i.e., particular 
functional and component design as well as component identification) precludes a 
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detailed quantitative reliability analysis. The fault tree will be constructed incorporating a 
qualitative analysis of the hardware design, with the capability to conduct subsequent 
quantitative analysis as required. The goal of a qualitative review will be to help identify 
weak areas of the design, particularly single point failures, in which a design work around 
could easily be incorporated. 
b. Research Questions 
There are two primary questions this thesis will address in order to help 
minimize the potential for a critical failure. 
(1) What are the critical failure modes of the PANS AT hardware architecture? 
(2) How can critical failures be minimized through hardware and software 
design modifications? 
C.     THESIS STRUCTURE 
The remaining portions of this thesis will adhere to the following composition. 
1. Chapter II: PANSAT BACKGROUND 
This chapter will provide the reader with a synopsis of the hardware and software 
architecture of the PANSAT program. This will provide a working understanding of the 
system design in it's present state. A review of the subsystem design, particularly the 
EPS, will be beneficial in understanding the system operation and the magnitude of the 
analysis required. A short description of the program timeline is included to provide the 
reader an understanding of the program life-cycle and the unique nature of a program 
whose primary development is supported by student involvement that is continuously 
changing. 
2. Chapter III: Reliability 
This chapter is devoted to the development of reliability issues involved in 
conducting a design analysis. A theoretical basis of the FTA methodology is discussed 
including its application to real world issues. There are numerous software packages 
available to assist a reliability engineer in the analysis of a system. A software package, 
called FaultrEASE, employing a FTA program, was used for the fault tree construction 
and analysis and is discussed for completeness. 
3. Chapter IV: PANSAT Fault Tree Analysis 
A detailed exploration of the fault tree constructed for the PANSAT project will be 
investigated in this chapter to answer the research questions.   Detailed analysis of the 
fault tree is provided to explore issues of potential problems. 
4. Chapter V: Summary 
This chapter will summarize the reliability issues uncovered during the analysis 
and the recommendations made for design modification. Follow on reliability analysis is 
suggested to assist in management decisions and further student research. 
5. Appendix A: Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) Fault Tree Analysis 
This appendix contains EPS block diagrams and schematics to assist the reader in 
understanding the system configuration. A fault tree of the EPS is included with analysis 
information summarized in tables describing the failure end events and failure event 
combinations which could cause a critical failure of the EPS. 
6. Appendix B: Communication Fault Tree Fault Tree Analysis 
This appendix contains a block diagram of the radio frequency (RF) subsystem to 
assist the reader in understanding the system configuration. A fault tree of the RF 
subsystem is included with analysis information summarized in tables describing the 
failure end events and failure event combinations which could cause a critical failure of 
the RF subsystem. 
7. Appendix C: Digital Control Subsystem Fault Tree Analysis 
This appendix contains a block diagram of the digital control subsystem (DCS) to 
assist the reader in understanding the system configuration. A fault tree of the DCS is 
included with analysis information summarized in tables describing the failure end events 
and failure event combinations which could cause a critical failure of the DCS. 
8. Appendix D: PANSAT FAULT TREE 
This appendix contains the fault tree constructed using the FaultrEASE software 
package. All the analysis results listed in the previous appendices were derived from this 
fault tree. 
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II. PANSAT BACKGROUND 
A. DEVELOPMENT 
The PANSAT program was conceived in 1989 as an interdisciplinary educational 
opportunity for NPS Space Systems Operations and Space Systems Engineering 
postgraduate students. Future duty assignments of students in these cirriculum will be in 
support of space system acquisition, design, and operation. 
The spacecraft consist of four major subsystems: Communications (COMM), 
Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS), Digital Control Subsystem (DCS), and the Structure 
subsystem. Contrary to other spacecraft designs, the PANSAT project does not contain 
two major subsystems found on most spacecraft. The Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
(GNC) and the Propulsion subsystems have been eliminated from the design to reduce 
complexity and cost. Additionally there is no active thermal control subsystem. 
B. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The hardware architecture is the principle focus for the reliability analysis, with a 
brief description of the envisioned software architecture mentioned for completeness. 
1. Hardware Architecture 
a. Structure 
The PANSAT structure provides the housing and support mechanisms for the 
other spacecraft (S/C) systems. Constituting a 26 sided polyhedron in which 18 of the 
sides are square and the remaining eight sides are triangular, the aluminum frame 
provides structural support for the internal electronic components as well as the externally 
mounted 17 solar panels which are attached to the square sides (Fig. 3). The one 
remaining square side is reserved for the launch vehicle interface (LVI). A design 
proposal is being studied for the utility of mounting a smaller solar panel within the void 
region of the LVI. If the additional solar panel concept is accepted, this gallium arsenide 
panel will provide additional power to the power system that is operating on a very tight 
power budget. 
Figure 3. PANSAT External Structure [Ref. 1] 
The approximately 19 inch diameter polyhedron was chosen to allow the 
mounting of the solar panels on the external skin of the S/C, allowing solar energy 
conversion in any orientation of the spacecraft and to minimize the range of values of 
solar flux area. The upper triangular sections of the external structure support the four 
dipole antennas, that are mounted in a tangential turnstile configuration. 
Internal equipment mounting support (Fig. 4) is provided by two equipment 
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Figure 4. PANSAT Internal Structure [Ref. 1] 
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b. Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) 
The electronic subsystems are functionally linked as depicted in the PANSAT 









Figure 5. PANSAT Functional Block Diagram 
Consisting of two major functional divisions, logic control and power 
distribution, the EPS is responsible for generating and disseminating all electrical power 
used throughout the spacecraft. The EPS functional block diagram is shown in (Fig. 6). 
Logic control of the EPS provides the necessary internal command and control 
interface with the digital control subsystem (DCS) for the distribution of power within the 
S/C. It also retains the capability to reinitialize the S/C in the event of a DCS failure. 
The reinitializing component of the EPS architecture is called the watchdog timer 
(WDT). The WDT is nothing more than a timing circuit, which is periodically reset by a 
signal from the DCS. This signal provides the WDT with the operational status of the 
DCS. If the WDT has not been reset after a given period of time, then the WDT will 
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assume the DCS has failed and cause power to be applied to the redundant DCS. This 
will in turn cause the S/C to begin initialization procedures. The WDT (Fig. A.3) does 
this operation by causing the D flip-flop, U27:A, to change state which triggers a signal to 
close the respective switch (Fig. A.l and A.5), either S7 or S8, which applies power to 
the redundant DCS and commences initialization procedures. 
The remainder of the EPS logic board provides an interface with the peripheral 
control bus (PCB) that allows the PCB to control EPS status measurements. The 
following measurements go directly to an analog input in the DCS: 
(1) Battery cell voltage monitoring 
(2) Battery current monitoring 
(3) Solar panel current monitoring 
(4) Total bus current 
(5) Raw bus voltage 
(6) Power switch control 
(7) WDT reset 
Primary electrical power is supplied by 17 solar panels (256 cm2 per panel). The 
panels are connected in parallel to the EPS raw bus. Each panel is double wired and 
fused on the power line at both the solar panel and the EPS bus connection, to increase 
the power source reliability. Blocking diodes from each panel prevent reverse current 
flow through a low power panel which would act as an energy sink and may cause panel 
damage. Each panel consists of one string containing 32 series connected silicon (Si) 
cells, each cell being 2 cm by 4 cm in size. 
During orbit eclipse periods, power is supplied from the secondary source of 
power, one of the two Nickel Cadmium (Ni-Cd) batteries, to maintain the bus voltage at 
12 ±3 Vdc. Each of the batteries contain 10 type D cells connected in series.   Space 
qualified batteries will not be employed due to their prohibitive cost. The use of 
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terrestrial batteries will be of beneficial experimental value for a S/C deployed in low 
earth orbit. Extensive battery testing is in progress to determine operational 
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Figure 6. PANSAT EPS Functional Block Diagram 
Power from the energy sources is isolated from distribution to the rest of the S/C 
by the use of mechanical launch switches. These switches, closed upon ejection from the 
shuttle, are a safety feature required by NASA to prevent accidental radiation of energy 
by the S/C until after it has been deployed from the shuttle cargo bay.   Two sets of 
switches , connected in parallel, are employed to increase switch operation (closure) 
reliability. 
Raw bus power (9 to 15 Vdc) to the various subsystems is controlled by 
electronic switching circuits, S5 through S15, to provide power to the DCS, Mass Storage 
(MASS), radio frequency (RF), Temperature Multiplexing (TMUX), and antenna 
deployment circuits. Each switch, with the exception of the RF, is fused to prevent a 
circuit failure in one switch or subsystem from being reflected throughout the EPS 
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distribution and cause a catastrophic failure. The RF switch is not fused, since the RF 
system contains some level of redundancy. A catastrophic failure in the RF subsystem 
will cause a critical failure regardless, and it is not desirable to deploy a system where one 
faulty fuse could cause a critical failure of the system. Each switch, with the exception of 
the DCS power switches, is controlled by a signal from the DCS to the EPS via the PCB. 
The DCS power switches, as previously mentioned, are controlled internal to the EPS by 
the WDT. 
c. Thermal Control 
The PANSAT design is unique in that it possesses no active thermal control 
devices. Preliminary thermal analysis have concluded that the passive thermal design 
system will maintain the components within their required limits. Various temperature 
sensors are mounted throughout the S/C to provide warnings and status and are included 
as part of the telemetry data. Only the battery temperature sensors will perform any 
active role, being used by the battery monitor program to determine and monitor battery 
state of charge, particularly during charging operations. The various analog temperature 
data points are multiplexed with the TMUX circuitry and passed to the DCS as analog 
signals. Each analog signal is converted to digital format via analog to digital (A/D) 
converters within the DCS and stored in the mass storage devices as historical telemetry 
data. 
d. Digital Control Subsystem (DCS) 
The DCS coordinates the operations of the EPS, RF communication suite, and 
other mission essential operations like health and welfare monitoring. The DCS consists 
of three principal modules: system controllers (SC), analog mulitplexers (MUX), and 
mass storage (MASS) devices. Redundant modules, designated A and B, are provided for 
each function. 
The compact design of the PANSAT structure necessitated a minimum quantity 
of interconnecting cabling within the S/C. The PCB provides a medium to distribute 
power to the various subsystems as well as a command and data signaling bus for the 
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DCS to control and monitor the S/C. Communication data, temperature monitoring data, 
and power sensing data are also passed on the PCB making it a vital link for all 
operations. This fact alone makes it a extremely important component, especially from a 
reliability viewpoint, since one wire break can cause a critical failure of the system. 
The SC is the hub from which all S/C operations are controlled. There are two 
printed circuit boards which comprise the SC module (Fig. 7), the DCS digital board and 
the modem board which is commonly referred to as the PARAMAX module. Each DCS 
digital board contains: 
1. Microprocessor (JIP) 
2. A/D converters (for multiplexed temperature, current, voltage measurements) 
3. PCB interface 
4. Error detection and correction (EDAC) for |1P random access memory (RAM) 
5. Serial communications controller (SCC) for the modem 
6. Programmable read only memory (PROM) 
The modem board is responsible for interfacing the digital data stream (i.e., 
message traffic) between the |1P (via the SCC) and the RF communication suite. The 
modulated intermediate frequency (IF) signal at 70 MHz is an input (output) from (to) the 
RF subsystem. The modem conducts A/D conversion (as required) and demodulation 
(and modulation) of the message. The signal is spread (and despread) using a pseudo 
noise (PN) code generator. 
Analog multiplexers on the DCS provide A/D conversion of temperature sensor 
data for telemetry monitoring and archiving in the MASS devices. This data is used for 
historical health and welfare monitoring by the NPS ground station and is included in the 
down-linked telemetry message. 
There are two redundant mass storage devices (MASS A and MASS B), each of 
which contain 4 megabytes of volatile static RAM as well as 512 kilobytes of non- 
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volatile flash memory. The non-volatile memory is not space qualified (non-radiation 
hardened) and is being flown on an experimental basis. The flash memory will not be 
relied upon to maintain any required software programs or message traffic, but will be 
used on an experimental basis to build a data base for future exploitation. 
System  Controller   Block   Diagram 
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Figure 7. PANSAT System Controller Block Diagram 
e. Communication (COMM) Subsystem 
The PANSAT communication subsystem (Fig. 8) is the only spacecraft payload 
Predominantly referenced as the RF subsystem, it will operate in the amateur radio 
community 70 centimeter wavelength band providing digital radio packet switching 
communication using direct spread spectrum techniques. The RF section is located on 
the lower equipment plate. It includes frequency conversion, low noise amplification 
(LNA), high power amplification (HPA), and raw bus power conditioning. 
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(1) Reception. The received signal from the antenna system is routed to the 
receiver section by the transmit/receive switch (T/R) shown in fig. 8 as S1. The signal is 
then routed to one of the two low noise amplifier (LNA) circuits by the signal routing 
switch (S2).    Frequency down shift to the 70 MHz intermediate frequency (IF) is 
performed by one of two signal mixers. The IF signal, still in DSSS format, is routed to 
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Figure 8. RF Subsystem Block Diagram 
(2) Transmission. A DSSS signal is routed from one of the DCS modem 
boards at IF to the common RF transmit switch (S9). The signal is routed to a mixer 
where it is shifted to transmit frequency of 366.5 MHz. Amplification of the signal is 
conducted by one of two high power amplifiers (HP A). Each HP A is composed of two 
cascaded amplifiers. The transmit signal is then routed to the antenna via the T/R switch. 
The antenna element consist of 4 dipole antennas in a tangential turnstile 
configuration mounted on the bottom half of the S/C (Fig. 3). The feed system connects 
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the four antennas and performs impedance matching between the antenna and the coaxial 
cable connecting the feed system to the band pass filter. 
Functional redundancy is built within the RF subsystem, with the exception of 9 
DCS commanded switches or relays used to route the receive and transmit signals. 
2. Software Architecture 
The computer system architecture employed by the PANS AT design may best be 
described as a model which incorporates both the software and hardware layers. Software 
tasks, which provide the user services, are placed on top the architectural hierarchy with 
protocol handlers (i.e., the operating system) and hardware structure as lower layers. 
Figure 9 demonstrates the hierarchy of the hardware communications equipment, 
operating system, protocol software and other software tasks for the S/C. 
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Figure 9. PANSAT Computer Architecture [Ref. 3] 
a. Operating system structure 
The PANSAT architecture will take advantage of two proven commercial 
software products, the Space Craft Operating System (SCOS) and a companion product 
called BekTek AX.25 (BAX) which implements the link layer protocol.   The SCOS will 
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provide a standard application program interface to assist in the development of 
multi-tasking applications. These services include a real-time multi-tasking kernel, 
message passing facilities for inter-task communications, Direct Memory Access (DMA), 
and interrupt driven Input/Output (I/O) drivers. 
Post launch modification of the software structure is a design requirement that 
will considerably enhance the functionality and reliability of the software environment. 
The experimental nature of the S/C does not permit an encompassing forecast of the S/C 
operating scenarios during the design process. 
The boot process will consist of the minimum actions required to initialize the 
necessary hardware so that the S/C is capable of communicating with the ground station. 
This will allow the capability to upload any software component, including the operating 
system. 
b. Link layered protocol 
Amateur packet radio is a communication technique that allows high speed and 
low error rate digital data exchange. A data link protocol was developed by the amateur 
radio community that is compatible with the seven layer Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) reference model. This protocol, called AX.25, was adopted by the amateur radio 
community as a offshoot of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT) X.25 data link layer protocol, a standard for packet switching. 
The data link layer, considered the second level protocol, provides the 
communication between physical layer (modem) with the network layer. For this design, 
this is basically the application programs. This is accomplished by receiving streams of 
bits from the physical layer and applying a structure, or frame, to those streams (Fig. 10). 
Each frame is composed of several smaller groups of data, called fields, which are used 
for various overhead data management and the raw data information. The AX.25 
protocol uses a technique called bit stuffing which is used to maintain a unique bit pattern 
sequencing within a frame and eliminate the possibility of flags appearing within the 
contents of a frame. Error detection of each frame, or cyclic redundancy checks (CRC), 
helps detect any corruption of data by the physical layer. 
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Figure 10. AX.25 Information Frame [Ref. 3] 
The AX.25 frame management scheme allows the information to be sent in 
packets, with up to eight outstanding frames in a relay sequence [Ref. 3]. Burst 
transmissions of these frames will allow multiple users in the same geographical area to 
access the S/C on a single pass. There are other small satellites deployed which possess 
this capability for packet switching, but none that have attempted to do it utilizing spread 
spectrum modulation techniques. 
c. Spacecraft Commanding 
Commanding of the S/C is required for software program uploads and other 
subsystem command functions. These command functions can include routine operations 
such as battery charging, battery reconditioning, and transmitter power level 
modifications. Commanding may also be necessary to reconfigure the system due to a 
failure, abnormal operation, or impending failure conditions. 
3. Ground Station 
A ground station is required to conduct S/C management, maintenance control, and 
data archiving. The ground station, located at NPS and administered by the Space 
Systems Academic Group (SSAG), will be the focal point for S/C commanding, software 
system uploads, health and welfare data collection, archiving, and will provide an 
external interface with the amateur radio community. This external interface, as presently 
planned, will be via the Internet with a dedicated world wide web (www) home page for 
the PANSAT program. This will provide the user not only the capability to obtain 
necessary access data such as orbital ephimerus, transmission frequency, S/C availability, 
and the PN code for spread spectrum operations, but also interesting program data such as 
user statistics and archived telemetry data. 
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C.     PROGRAM LIFE-CYCLE 
The PANS AT project has evolved from conception in 1989 to it's present design 
state . As depicted in Fig. 11, a subsystem design freeze in late 1995 will be made to 
support a STS-86 Atlantis launch in late 1997. 
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Figure 11. PANSAT Design Life-cycle 
1. Mission Duration 
The present launch scenario from the shuttle, would give the S/C an orbit life of 
approximately two years before it decays into the earth's atmosphere. Other launch 
options, including various shuttle orbits, are being investigated as possible launch 
scenarios. Regardless of the launch scenario, a two year mean mission duration 
requirement is maintained for the S/C hardware architecture. 
2. Launch Options 
a. Hitchhiker Program 
The PANSAT S/C can be launched from a Shuttle Get Away Special (GAS) 
canister as a payload of the hitchhiker program. The S/C is mounted in a GAS canister in 
the shuttle's cargo bay by a marman clamp from an ejection mechanism to the S/C LVI. 
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No other interface between the S/C and the shuttle is required. All commanding and 
control of the S/C will be made by the NPS ground station once the S/C is deployed and 
initialized. 
b. Minuteman 
Launch from a refurbished minuteman launch vehicle is a recent option available 
for spacecraft desiring a LEO. Capable of placing PANSAT in a much higher orbit and 
inclination, it radically modifies the orbital and mission options. Able to place the S/C in 
sun-synchronous orbit, it could modify the deployment requirements of a power 
conscious design such as PANSAT or a follow-on project. 
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in. RELIABILITY 
A.     RELIABILITY ANALYSIS BACKGROUND 
The political climate in today's marketplace, both government and industrial, does 
not afford the decision maker the luxury of balloon budgets and long production lead 
times.   Social, political, and economic constraints dictate the exploitation of alternative 
methods to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of every system produced. The 
goal of reliability analysis thus becomes a technique to measure and enhance the systems 
reliability at minimum cost. This will permit program managers and system designers to 
deploy the most cost effective system. 
1. Stages of Systems Analysis 
There are two avenues of thought process which encompass system reliability 
analysis. These processes are inductive and deductive reasoning [Ref. 4]. The two 
processes may be unique to a particular analysis method or stage in the analysis 
procedure. 
a. Inductive 
During the inductive stage, information is researched, gathered, and organized to 
conceptualize the systems definition, functional description, and determination of the 
critical components. This process helps to answer the question "What can happen to the 
system as a result of a component failure or human error?". 
b. Deductive 
The deductive analysis of a system design helps answer the question "How can 
the system fail?".   A logic tree is often the best device for deducing how a major system 
failure event could occur. Application of such a method requires an in-depth 
understanding of how the system operates within the operational environment. Many 
methods of analysis are available for performing the analysis, such as fault tree analysis, 
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decomposition, circuit stress analysis, or the state space approach. Each application may 
be more suitable at various stages of the program life-cycle. Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
was chosen for PANS AT hardware design analysis due to the applicability of the process 
to the design status. The use of FT A can be very beneficial as a design tool to identify 
potential flaws in a system design and help eliminate costly design changes and retrofits. 
Equally valuable as a diagnostic tool, it can predict the mostly likely causes of a system 
failure. 
2. Phased Mission Profiles 
The various mission profiles of spacecraft (S/C) operation have distinct effects on 
system reliability. A mission phase is defined as a period of time in which the functional 
organization of the system is constant. The system must accomplish a specific task, or set 
of tasks, during each particular phase. Detailed analysis of a system must be 
accomplished independently for each phase of the mission life-cycle. 
Due to the simplistic operational profile of the PANS AT S/C, due largely to the 
absence of any attitude control or orbital plane change requirements, the life-cycle 
mission can be reduced into two basic mission phases, launch/initialization and 
operations. 
a. Launch and Initialization 
This phase begins immediately upon deployment of the S/C from the GAS 
canister. During this phase the S/C powers up subsequent to a successful deployment, 
and when in "daylight" (design analysis assumes dead batteries upon launch) conducts 
hardware and basic operating system initialization procedures which include: 
(1) Hardware diagnostics which test for failure conditions and configure the 
S/C accordingly. Diagnostic procedures are continuously performed if the S/C has failed 
to acquire communications with the NPS ground station. 
(2) A basic operating system is loaded from onboard ROM storage. This 
system contains the basic command list for the higher level operating system . The higher 
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level operating system and application software is uploaded from the NPS ground station 
once the communication link has been established and the S/C is in a stable 
configuration. 
(3) It is anticipated that both onboard storage batteries will be depleted upon 
ejection from the shuttle. An initialization procedure will require at least one of the 
batteries to be charged to an acceptable level prior to any interaction of the S/C with a 
ground station. 
(4) The four dipole antennas are tied back in a stowed condition while the S/C 
is in the GAS canister. Upon ejection from the canister the antennas will be deployed by 
burning the nylon restraints with heaters powered by the solar arrays. 
(5) Link closure with the NPS ground station is the final objective for the 
initialization segment. If satisfactory conditions are present, the high level operating 
system and application software will be up loaded to the S/C. 
The launch and initialization phase could last several days before the link with 
NPS has been established. Following software uploads the S/C will undergo a testing 
period. 
b. Operations 
This phase is the normal operating mode of the S/C. The S/C enters this phase 
once the preceding phase is completed satisfactorily. The analysis of this thesis will 
concentrate on this phase, assuming initialization phase has occurred without incident. 
B.     FAULT TREE ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION 
It is beneficial to understand the background of FTA to gain a better appreciation of 
the basis, application, and limitations of the method. As a visual tool it is useful in 
communicating and supporting decisions based upon the analysis, both for the design 
engineer and the management decision maker. Fault tree analysis also provides a 
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convenient and efficient format that is helpful for both qualitative and quantitative 
evaluation [Ref. 4]. 
1. Historical Background 
Conceived by H. A. Watson of the Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1961 to evaluate 
the safety of the Minuteman ICBM launch control system, the method has evolved into 
one of the most powerful analytical tools used to evaluate system safety [Ref. 5]. As the 
method has developed, its application to solving real world analysis problems has also 
expanded. Once a tedious procedure requiring large analytical teams, it can now be 
performed by a single reliability analyst using powerful reliability software tools. The 
application of FT A has spread from humble beginnings in the aerospace industry to vast 
commercial applications, including its use as the principal method for system safety 
analysis (hazard analysis) in the nuclear power industry. 
2. Fault Tree Analysis Utility 
Events or situations requiring the application of FT A are typically identified by 
inductive analysis or system analyst intuition. Typically the events are the result of some 
subsystem functional failure. The method is unusually versatile in that it permits 
sensitivity analysis, analysis qualification, analysis quantification, and evaluation of 
alternative designs for potential tradeoffs. The FTA method is unique in that it also can 
be used to create a success tree. 
a. Advantages 
The FTA method has four major advantages over other forms of systems critical 
failure analysis [Ref. 5]. 
(1) Directs the analyst deductively to accident related events. The deductive 
approach to describing how a system could fail, often referred to as the top-down 
approach, will uncover all failures or combinations thereof which could cause the 
undesired event. This kind of approach lends itself to better organization and control than 
other methods based on a bottom-up approach. 
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(2) Provides depiction of system functions that lead to undesired.outcomes. 
The graphical representation of the fault tree provides the decision maker with a clear and 
concise understanding of the inter-relationship of failure events. 
(3) Provides options for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
Quantitative analysis is desirable if solid reliability data is available for the tree's end 
events. Quantification permits the measurement of the likelihood of occurrence of the top 
event, node, or subsystem within the tree. Probabilistic measures of importance (i.e., 
reliability importance) can be obtained and an objective measure of the risk can be 
ascertained utilizing this approach. 
Early in the development cycle reliability data may not be available due to 
either insufficient reliability data on the components or the maturity of the design. 
Qualitative analysis, however, can provide the failure event sets and measures of the 
importance of the individual end events in the causation process. Qualitative analysis is 
more commonly used because it does not require precise failure rates for the end events. 
It results in sets of events that cause the top event and a ranking of these events for their 
importance in causing the top event. This relationship is known as the systems structural 
importance. 
(4) Provides analyst with insight into system behavior. The process of FTA is 
so detailed in its logical relationships, that it forces the analyst to understand the system 
beyond the level enjoyed by even some subsystem design engineers or system managers. 
b. Disadvantages 
The significant shortcomings of FTA, that may be of any consequence, relate to 
the process of synthesizing a fault tree. Often time consuming and overwhelming in 
detail, even for designs as simple as PANSAT, can require considerable effort to embrace 
a comprehensive study of all the common cause failures. Failure mode oversight and 
omission may be one of the major drawbacks to FTA, but this is true for any analysis 
methodology. 
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Modeling of the fault tree may be difficult when attempting to describe the 
failure of system components that can operate in a degraded mode. The Boolean logic 
structure of the fault tree assumes a component is either working or has failed. This fact 
limits FTA process to analyzing the system for critical failures only. 
Despite its drawbacks, as systems become increasingly more complex, the 
deductive and systematic approach used by FTA becomes increasingly beneficial. The 
increased availability of low cost software packages has been an overwhelming aid in 
constructing and analyzing fault trees, making the effort not only beneficial but time and 
cost efficient as well. 
c. Assumptions 
Similar to all forms of analysis methods, FTA is restricted to the domain 
constraints for which it is valid. The following assumptions were made to assist in the 
synthesis of the fault tree. 
(1) The composition of fault tree assumes components are capable of only 
two states of performance, either functioning or failed.   The probability the component 
is functioning at some time t may be characterized by some statistical distribution. The 
exponential distribution is often chosen for components exhibiting constant, or nearly 
constant, failure rates.   As with the components, the system is dependent upon the 
performance of it's components and is capable of only obtaining two states of 
performance, functioning or failed. 
(2) Each of the systems components is assumed to have statistically 
independent lives. There is no ability to repair or replace any component, and each 
embraces a finite lifetime. 
(3) The S/C physical structure is assumed to remain intact for the duration of 
its mission. Although it will undergo stress and strains, particularly during launch, it is 
assumed that it will never operate outside it's design envelope. No structural component 
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will experience strains greater than the elastic limit nor fatigue failure due to mechanical 
and thermal cycling. 
(4) Each component in the fault tree is relevant to the systems operation. 
This infers that each basic event appears in at least one of the minimum cut sets. A 
minimum cut set is defined as combination of the fewest component failures that cause 
the system to fail. Complex systems my have a large number of minimum cut sets. 
C.     THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
System structures are based on two generic structures. These are the series and the 
parallel structured systems. The series system functions if all of it's components function, 
and the parallel system functions if at least one of it's components function (Fig. 12). 
The relationship of the performance of the components to the performance of the system 
defines the performance logic of the system. Fault tree analysis will correlate the 
functional block diagram of the system structure to the logic structure of the system. The 
following background will illustrate the development of FTA theory, and insures essential 
issues are addressed in the synthesis of the fault tree. The vast majority of the following 
theoretical derivation was taken from Professor J.D. Esary notes [Ref. 6] and notes from a 
reliability course [Ref. 7]. 
1. Structure Function 
The structure function, O(x), for a system relates the operation of a system's 
components to the operation of the system.   There are many analytical advantages to the 
derivation of the structure function as will be evident later. 
a. Notation 
(1) All vectors are represented in bold case type 
(2) T is the time to system failure 
(3) Tj is the time to component i failure 
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(4) X; is a Binomial random variable (r.v.) of the component i with value 
1 if component i is functioning 1 
X;   = 0 if component i has failed 
(5) x = {x,, x2,..., xn} is the system state vector in which n components 
describe the system structure. 
(6) P[Xj=l] = Pi  is the probability of component i working at some time t 
(7) P[xs =0] = 1-pj   is the probability component i has failed by time t 
(8) p = {p,, p2,..., pn} is the system probability vector 
(9) E[y] is the expected value of the r.v. y 
— 1 2 3 
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Figure 12. Generic System Structures 
(10) O(x) is the system structure function describing the state of the system. 
1 if system is working at time t 1 0(x)= 
0 otherwise 
(11) <!>( 1 i, x) represents the structure function in which the ith component of 
the state vector x has the binomial value of one. 
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(12) 0(0j,x) represents the structure function in which the ith component of 
the state vector x has the binomial value of zero. 
(13) Mathematical notation: 





b. Series Structure 
The series structured system (Fig. 12) demands each component to function in 
order for the system to function. If any component were to fail then the system would 
subsequently fail. The system lifetime is therefore dependent upon the weakest link, or 
the shortest component lifetime. The system structure function for a series structured 
system is shown in eq. 1 as the multiplication of all the component binomial states. 
P[T>t] = P[min(T,,T2,---,Tn)>t] 
0(x) = jliff^^2,-,nl 
[Oifanyx^O j 
(1) = flxi 
i=l 
c. Parallel Structure 
The parallel structured system (Fig. 12) only requires at least one of the parallel 
component's operation in order for the system to operate. If all the components in parallel 
were to fail then the system would system fail. The system lifetime is therefore 
dependent upon the longest component lifetime. Equation 2 demonstrates how the 
parallel system structure function is determined.   A simple example at the conclusion of 
this chapter provides insight for the application of this mathematical notation. 
P[T>t] = P[max(T1)T2,--,Tn)>t] 
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<Wx) = J lifanyxi=l;i=l,2,--.,n 1 
v
       [0iffallxi=0;i=l,2,--MI J 
(2) =LJxi = l-fl(l-xi) = x1Ux2lJ-IJxn 
i=l i=l 
2. Component Relevance 
A component is relevant to the systems operation if it's failure can affect the 
performance of the system, and should be considered when conducting the failure 
analysis. If component i is relevant to the systems operation then eq. 3 is true. 
(3) <D(li,x)^O(0i,x)V(-i,x) 
Conversely if a component is irrelevant it's operation has no influence on the 
function of the system, and the condition of eq. 4 is always true. 
(4) O(li,x) = «D(0i,x)Vx 
The concept of relevance is important when determining the reliability function of 
the system. Only components relevant to the system operation should be considered 
when determining the reliability of the system. An importance consideration in defining 
component relevance therefore becomes one of defining what constitutes the systems 
operational status. 
3. Coherent Systems 
A system is defined as a coherent system if it's structure function satisfies the 
following three conditions. 
a. O(l) = 1 where 1 is the vector (1, 1,..., 1) 
b. 0(0) = 0 where 0 is the vector (0, 0,..., 0) 
c. <&(x) < <J>(y) whenever Xj <yi Vi 
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A coherent structure is monotonic non-decreasing in x and all structure components 
are relevant to the systems operation. Many times the structure function is not easily 
defined, but can be approximated by bounding the function. The structure function can 
always be bounded below by the series structured case and bounded above by the parallel 




4. Minimal Path and Minimal Cut Sets 
a. Minimal Path Sets 
A path set of a coherent system is the set of components, which by all working, 
cause the system to function. The minimal path set is the smallest subset of components 
within the path set which by all working cause the system to function. The union of all 
minimum path sets then define the set of system relevant components. Using vector 
notation for the system of components, a path set would be the combination of set x 
components that satisfy: 
(6) O(x) = 1 (i.e., system working) 
Let pj describe the jth minimum path set (p possible minimum path sets) where 
pj (x) is a binary function. Since all components of a minimum path set must function for 
the system to function, the minimum path set is similar to the series system structure. 
Equation 7 defines the structure of the minimum path set function. 
/-7i / N    TT        [ 1 if all x. working (7) pj(x) = llxi=    .    .      '. i€Pj        [ 0 otherwise 
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Only one minimum path set must function for the system to function. The 
parallel arrangement of minimum path sets can therefore describe the systems structural 
relationship. Equation 8 describes the system structure function using the minimum path 
set notation. Figure 13 shows a pictorial relationship for the minimum path sets for an 
example problem. 
(8) 0(x) = LIPj(x) 
j=i 
The structure function can then be viewed as a parallel arrangement of the path 
sets. This is typically referenced as a parallel-series arrangement. 
b. Minimum Cut Sets 
A cut set of a system's structure refers to a combination of component failures 
that would cause the systems failure. The minimum cut set is therefore the smallest 
subset of components which by all failing cause the system to fail. Analysis of minimum 
cut sets are an important aspect of FTA from a qualitative standpoint. Similarly to the 
path set notation, a cut set is one that satisfies eq. 9. 
(9) O(x) = 0 (i.e., system failed) 
Let Kj be the jth minimum cut set (k possible minimum cut sets) where Kj(x) is 
a binary function. All the components in a minimum cut set must fail to cause the system 
to fail. This is similar to a parallel structured system. Equation 10 defines the minimum 
cut set function. 
,    , , ,    T T 0 iff all x. in the cut set have failed 
(10) Kj(X) = Uxi=      1     tu        ■ i6Ki 1 otherwise 
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Only one minimum cut set must fail to cause the system to fail. The series 
arrangement of cut sets can therefore describe the systems structural relationship. 
Equation 11 describes the system structure function using the minimum cut set notation. 




The system will fail if at least one of the Kj fail. The structure function is 
referenced in this case as a series arrangement of cut sets. This is typically referenced as 
a series-parallel arrangement. 
5. Importance 
It is often productive to gain an insight to a component's importance to the systems 
operation while conducting systems analysis. Qualitative analysis can provide 
information to measure a component's importance to the system structure, which in turn 
can direct design efforts to minimize the failure condition. Once such tools, called 
structural importance, can play an effective role in the analytical procedure. The 
component x* is said to be structurally important the condition of eq. 12 is true. 
(12) O(li,x)-O(0i,x)=l 
The components operation is important for the systems operation for a given system 
state vector x. The frequency for which eq. 12 holds true (for every state value of the 
vector x) will determine the structural importance of the component. For example, if a 
component is listed in 1000 minimum cut sets it would have a higher structural 
importance than a component that is listed in only 10 minimum cut sets. A parallel 
argument using path sets can also be made. A meaningful measure of a component's 
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structural importance would be to count how many times eq. 12 holds true for the system 
structure.   Equation 13 defines this frequency of occurrence. 
(13) n*(i)= £  [<J)(li,x)-O(0i,x)]    (n is a integer number) 
xlxj=l 
To represent the relative structural importance of component (i) with other 
components in the structure, the components are normalized by eq. 14 for a system of size 
m relevant components. The term I<j>(i) is known as the normalized structural importance 
for the ith component. 
(14) Mi) = ^T 
A similar argument can be derived which determines the component's importance 
from a reliability standpoint. For example, a series component, which is a single point 
failure component, has a mean time to failure (MTTF) of 10 years may not have a 
reliability importance as critical to that of two redundant parallel components that have a 
MTTF of 60 days. To determine a component's reliability importance you must be able to 
determine reliability data for all the relevant components in the system structure. The 
determination of reliability importance is shown in eq. 15. 
(15) Ih(i)=E[<D(li,x)-O(0i,x)] 
6. Reliability Function 
Given the components in a system operate independently, with Binomial r.v. x = 
(xp x2,..., xn), then we can describe the reliability of the system with the reliability 
function h(p). Equation 16 describes the formulation of the reliability function. 
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(16) h(p) = P[0(x) = 1] = E[0>(x)] 
This equation holds true only if the x/s are statistically independent. Using the 
reliability function, the reliability importance described previously can be simply 
determined using eq. 17 for each component. 
(17) Ih(i) = h(li,x)-h(Oi,x) = Jk- 
7. Association 
The previous reliability discussions have assumed component independence.   In 
real world applications this is not always true and should not be lightly assumed. The 
independence relationship between components will be replaced with an alternative form, 
association, which is simply non-negative dependence between the components [Ref. 8]. 
System components can become positively dependent in various manners. For example, 
two components located side by side on a printed circuit board are subject to the same 
operational environment. Environmental conditions that effect one component may also 
effect the other. This creates a common positive dependence between the components. 
Random variables (x,, x2,..., xn} are said to be associated if there is non-negative 
covariance between the random variables. Properties of associated r.v.'s are further 
explained in Ref. 6. 
The components of PANSAT fall into the positive dependence category due to the 
environmental effects. If the reliability is calculated using independent assumptions then 
the reliability is underestimated for series structure and overestimated for the parallel 
structure. The reliability value can be bounded, assuming association, by the series and 
parallel cases.   Assume a system consists of k possible minimum cut sets and p possible 
minimum path sets, then the following theorem, eq. 18, can be shown [Ref. 6] to bound 
the system reliability. 
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(18) nP[Kj(x) = 1] < P[0(x) = 1] < DP[Pj(x) = !] 
A tighter bound for the reliability, eq. 19, can be generated by observing the 
probability values for the minimum cut set and minimum path set functions, and applying 
the most limiting conditions for upper and lower bounds [Ref. 6]. 
(19) .^np.sww-iis^iip. 
8. Special Structure System (k-out-of-n) 
An offshoot of the parallel structure is a system that works if k-out-of-n 
components function. A practical application of the k-out-of-n concept to the PANSAT 
design is the notion of solar panel failure. The system will not fail if one solar panel fails, 
but is definitely inoperable if all 17 solar panels fail. There is some number, k, in which 
the system remains functional only if at least k panels are operable. Solar panel failure is 
an important concern for PANSAT due to it's operation on a very restrictive power 
margin. 
The simple case, where two out of three components are required to be 
operational for a system to function, is shown in Fig. 13. The diagram shows 
representation using the minimum path set approach and the minimum cut set approach. 
Each path represents the minimum component combinations (i.e., two) for a successful 
mode of system operation. This is referred to the minimum path set representation of the 
system structure. Figure 13 also shows the minimum cut set representation, where two 
component failures will cause the system to fail. 
Since this is a parallel system, the minimum path sets are obtained by observing 
the system functional structure. Any combination of two working components will allow 
the system to function. Application of eq. 7 to the observed set of minimum path sets (x,, 
x2), (x,, x3), and (x2, x3) will result in the following . 
pi =XiX2;p2 = XiX3;p3=X2X3 
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The structure function is determined by applying the minimum path sets to eq. 8. 
a>(x) = 0(Xi,X2,X3) = XiX2LJXlX2LJX2x3 
= XiX2LJ[l-(l-XiX3)(l-X2X3)] 
= X1X2LJ [1 - (1 -X2X3 -X1X3 +X1X2X3)] 
= XiX2LJ[XiX3+X2X3-XiX2X3] 
= [1 - (1 -X1X2XI -(X1X3 +X2X3 -X1X2X3))] 
= 1- I-X1X3-X2X3-X1X2 
+X1X2X3 +X1X2X3 +X1X2X3 -X1X2X3X 
= XiX2 + XiX3+X2X3-2XiX2X3 
Since the r.v., xs, is binomial (i.e., has a value of 0 or 1) the expansion of the 
above equation is reduced to single order terms by noting the fact that any power of Xj is 
equal to it's first order value (i.e., xPj = Xj for any integer power p). Reduction of the 
structure function to single order terms is necessary before a one to one correlation of the 
structure function to the reliability function can be made.   Recall the reliability function 
is only defined for a system of independent components. 
An identical system structure solution could be obtained by using the minimum 
cut set approach. This is demonstrated with an example at the end of the chapter. 
The structure function for the k-out-of-n system structure obtains the binomial 
value shown in eq. 20. A closed form notation of the structure function is not provided 
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The reliability function, shown in eq. 20, can be described for the k-out-of-n case 
if the system is configured of identical components and reliability. 
(21) h(p) = tHpj(1-P)n_J j=k VJ J 
D.     FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION 
The objective of FT A is to model the system conditions that result in an undesirable 
event under constrained environmental conditions. The fault tree models the various 
combinations of possible events, both normal and faulty, to give a graphical and logical 
representation of the systems response resulting in the "Top Event" failure. Setting well 
defined (yet practical) spatial and temporal bounds on the system is a necessary 
consideration required of the analyst to ensure the validity of the analysis of a phased 
system. Figure 14 illustrates the relationship of the system failure (labeled Top Event) to 
the basic component failures (bottom event or leaves). The conditioning events between 
the Top event and the fault tree's leaves describe events that could lead to the Top Event. 
The intermediate events are known as the branches of the fault tree. 
1. Methodology 
The FTA method structures the relationship of sequential events that lead to an 
undesired event in a system, to a Boolean logic representation model that reflect the 
systems functional structure. The top down analysis systematic approach to FTA 
attempts to define all possible, yet practical, critical failure paths that will cause the Top 
Event.   The fault tree grows downward and outward describing the failures and causes in 
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increasing detail. The fault tree symbology described below represent that used within 
the FaultrEASE software package [Ref. 9] that was utilized for this analysis. 
Fault Tree Composition 
/     Bottom     1 Bottom 
V    Event »1    I Ev.nI, 
S 
I    Bottom    \ 
I    Event #6   J 
Figure 14. Fault Tree Composition 
a. Symbology 
(1) Event Symbology. There are various types of failure end events that are 
represented in the fault tree structure. The synthesis, or structuring, of the events 
provides a logical fault flow process by combining the system failure events with Boolean 
logic operators. The respective event symbols (Fig. 15) describe the type of events, and 
when combined with the logical operators help define a cut set for the Top Event 
occurrence. End events are referred to as the leaves of the fault tree. 
(2) Logic Gate Symbology. The fault tree represents the logical relationship 
between the events of the system. These relationships can be described using a wide 
assortment of Boolean logic operators (i.e., Boolean logic gates). The two basic logical 
relationships used to describe the majority of the fault tree relationships are the logical 
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"OR" and "AND" operators (Fig. 16). Within the fault tree, a rectangle is placed above 
each operator to describe the event. 
o k  Name: Usage: Undeveloped Event An event that is not further developed n Name: External Event i i Usage: An event that is normally expected to occur 
o Name: Usage: Conditioning Event Applies specific conditions or restrictions 
A Name: Usage: Transfer In Indicates that the tree is developed further 
Ü Name: Usage: Basic Event A basic initiating fault requiring no further development o Name: Inhibit S^ Usage: Output fault occurs if the input fault occurs in the presence of an 
enabling condition 
Figure 15. Fault Tree Event Symbology [Ref. 9] 
/^^v       Name: 
I       I       Equation: 
I I        Usage: 
AND 
A*B 
Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur 
/R\     Name: [/ \ I        Equation: 
IT    M       Usage: 
Priority AND 
A*B 
Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur in a specific sequence 
•v      Name: 
/    \    Equation: 
L     J   Usage: 
OR 
A + B - (A • B) 
Output fault occurs if at least one of the input faults occurs 
>y     Name: 
ff ^   Equation: 
l~    J   Usage: 
Exclusive OR 
A + B - 2(A * B) 
Output fault occurs if exactly one of the input faults occurs 
s\.      Name: 
/ f"l\    Equation: 
L     J   Usage: 
Mutually Exclusive OR 
A + B 
Output fault occurs if any input fault occurs - but only one can 
1                 Name: 
I                 Equation: 
I                  Usage: 
Vertical Line 
A 
A connecting line used for placing symbols on a lower level 
Figure 16. Fault Tree Logical Operator Symbology [Ref. 9] 
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b. Event Classifications 
Although a fault tree can contain normal events, the vast majority of events 
appearing within the tree are failure events. Any event that propagates the failure event 
needs to be considered during the fault tree synthesis. When defining events, the analyst 
should observe the no miracle rule. The no miracle rule states that low probability events 
that prevent fault flow need not be considered, but low probability events that cause fault 
flow must be considered. 
There are five general classifications that describe the failure events that are 
logically linked in the fault tree structure. [Ref. 5] 
(1) Primary Failure. These are component related failures caused by problems 
internal to the component. Repair of a primary failure will return the system to operation. 
However, as with the case of PANS AT, repair of primary failures is not typically 
possible with deployed spacecraft. This is the principle failure type that will be analyzed. 
(2) Secondary Failure. This is a component related failure caused external to 
the component. Repairing a secondary failure does not bring the system back to a 
functioning condition if the external problems are not additionally addressed. Examples 
of secondary failures are environmental stresses such as temperature or vibration stress. 
(3) Primary Fault. These are event occurrences that create fault flow that are 
not component related. This could be a normal event or one that is caused by human 
interaction. A primary fault may self repair. 
(4) Secondary Fault. This type of event propagates the fault flow that is 
externally influenced. If the conditions causing the fault, such as signal jamming, are 
removed the secondary fault may self repair. 
(5) Command Fault. This is defined as a fault or failure which is caused by 
commands external to the source of the fault. An example would be the inadvertent 
activation of a relay due to a command fault. 
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2. Fault Tree Synthesis 
The synthesis (construction) of a fault tree should follow a few well-tested rules to 
avoid logic errors or omission of failure events [Ref. 5]. Definition of the correct top 
event, that event that is most undesirable, must be accurately considered. The entire 
synthesis of the fault tree stems from this definition. Accurate boundary conditions are 
required to predict the various failure events for which that phased mission operating 
conditions are valid. 
The next level is defined below the top event by analyzing what set of events are 
the most immediate and necessary to cause the top event. At this level, event definition 
may be very general in nature. To generate the causal events of the preceding event the 
analysts should ask two general rules. [Ref. 5] 
1. What are the most immediate and sufficient causes of this event? 
2. Is this a component related event? 
Each event is analyzed as to the causation. If the event is caused by a component 
related event, then an OR gate is placed under the event. If it is not a component related 
event but a system state related event, then the analyst is free to place any type of gate 
under the event as deemed logically appropriate. This process is continued, building a 
logic tree from the top event down to system defined end state events. 
E.     FAULT TREE EXAMPLE 
An example of a simple system is provide to show how fault tree synthesis and 
analysis is conducted. A comparison of doing the analysis by hand and the analysis 
generated by the FaultREASE program used is provided. 
Consider the simple coherent system depicted in Fig. 17.   If component one was to 
fail, or both components' two and three were to fail, the system would become inoperable. 
Therefore the minimum cut sets are {1} and {2, 3}. Conversely if components' one and 
two, or components' one and three were operating then the system would function. This 
describes the minimum path sets as {1, 2} and {1,3}. The system structure can be 
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represented using minimum cut set or minimum path set notation. Either approach will 
give identical results as will be shown below. 
Figure 17. Simple System Functional Structure 
1. Cut set notation 
It is convenient to represent the system, regardless of the approach, as a graphical 
representation to aid in further analysis. As the system gets larger and increasingly 
complex this can become too burdensome. Figure 18 depicts the cut set representation of 
the system structure. 
Figure 18. Minimum Cut Set Representation 
The minimum cut set functions are derived using eqn 10. 
Ki(x) = Xi 
K2 = X2U X3 = 1 " (1 " X2)(l - X3) 
From the minimum cut sets, the structure function is determined using eq. 11. 
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<t>(x) = 0(x,, x2, x3) = fl Kj(x) 
j=l 
= K,K2 = [X,][1-(1-X2)(1-X3)] 
= [X1][X2+X3-X3X2] 
=XiX2+XiX3-XiX2X3 
If the system is assumed to be independent, the reliability function can be derived 
utilizing eq. 16. 
h(p) = E[0(x)]=pip2 + pip3-pip2p3 
2. Path set notation 
Similar to the cut set example, the minimum path set graphical representation of the 
system structure shown in Fig. 19 can be useful. 
Figure 19. Minimum Path Set Representation 
The minimum path sets are derived using eq. 7. 
pi =XiX2 
p2=XiX3 
From the minimum path sets, the structure function is determined using eq. 8. 





=xix2+xiX3-XiX2X3        (recall XjP = Xj) 
= XiX2 + XiX3-XiX2X3 
As previously stated the path analysis derivation of the structure function is 
identical to that of cut set derivation. The approach the analyst takes, either cut set or 
path set, is determined by the type of analysis that is being conducted. 
The structural importance of a component in a system is determined by evaluating 
the state vector x under all conditions, while the reliability importance could be evaluated 
by assigning component reliability values. Assuming component independence the 
reliability importance can be derived from the reliability function as shown below. 
Ih(i) = h(lj,p) - h(0i,p) = -^ (if independent) dpj 
Ih(1) = P2+P3-P2P3 
Ih(2) = p,-p,p3 
4(3) = P1-P1P2 
3. Fault Tree Model 
The system functional block diagram (Fig. 17) is used to synthesis the fault tree 
shown in Fig. 20. This was accomplished using the rule set explained previously and 
incorporating the FaultREASE software package. As an example of the software's 
computational capabilities, probability values that the components would fail (q- 1-p.) 
were assigned to the components. The reliability values are represented on the programs 
printout below the end event leaves. 
To illustrate this example, assume the components are independent and have the 
reliability values of: 
p,= 0.9 and p2= p3= 0.7 
thus q,= 1-0.9 = 0.1 
q2=q3= 1-0.7 = 0.3 
Using the reliability function derived previously, the system operation reliability 
can be calculated as: 
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h(p) = (0.9X0.7) + (0.7X0.7) - (0.9)(0.7)(0.7) = 0.819 
The fault tree, when quantified, will calculate the probability of the top event 
occurrence (i.e., system failure) to be 0.181, which is shown in Fig. 20 as the value the 
top event attains. The probability that the system will fail, which is 1-P[system 




Component #2 and #3 
Failure 
9. x 10 
Figure 20. Example System Fault Tree 
Table 1 summarizes the calculation of the structural importance for each of the 
system components. The structural importance of component one is much greater than 
that of components' two and three that are identical. This intuitively makes sense because 
component one is a series component and so the failure of this component has a much 
greater affect on the systems operation. 
The reliability importance for each component is calculated and summarized in 
Table 1. Component one has a higher reliability value, and this coupled with its 
structural placement demonstrates it's relative effect on reliability importance. By 
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conducting sensitivity analysis on the reliability value for component one it can be shown 
to retain a higher relative reliability importance than components' two or three. 
State Vector <&(x) Component #1 Component #2 Component #3 




(1,1,0) 1 1 1 
(1,0,1) 1 1 
(0,1,1) 0 
(1,1,1) 1 1 1 
Mi) 3 1 1 
I*(i) 3/4 1/4 1/4 
Ih(i) 0.91 0.07 0.07 
Table 1. Example System Importance 
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IV. PANSAT FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
The PANSAT schematic diagrams listed as figures in appendices A, B, and C were 
used to construct the PANSAT fault tree listed in appendix D. Interaction with the 
specific subsystem design engineers was necessary to ensure interpretation accuracy of 
the design architecture. 
It was never the intention of the author to completely model the design down to 
the individual component level. From a qualitative analysis viewpoint for the PANSAT 
project, determination of significant failure points was the overall goal of this thesis. This 
permits design engineers to assess the fault tree analytical results and make appropriate 
design modifications as deemed appropriate.   The hardware architecture analyzed 
included the EPS, DCS, and RF subsystems. Time limitations prevented detailed analysis 
of each subsystem. The majority of the analytical effort was spent on the evaluation of 
the EPS. 
Subsystem design modifications are a natural and continuous process at this stage 
of the program life-cycle. Modifications made during the course of this analytical process 
may not be reflected in this analysis. 
A PANSAT system structure function could be generated using the minimum cut 
sets listed in Tables A.2, B.2, and C.2. From the structure function the structural 
importance of each failure event could be determined by evaluating the function using a 
system state vector, x, of 324 variables correlating to the failure events. Evaluation of the 
structural importance using the procedure discussed in chapter 3 for this analysis would 
provide no significant benefit to the design process and be nothing more than an arduous 
academic exercise. The version of the FaultrEASE software package used for the fault 
tree construction and analysis did not include the capability for evaluation of the 
structural importance, although the reliability importance could be calculated if reliability 
data was available. 
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A.     EPS 
The analytical printout of the data derived from the fault tree for the EPS is 
contained in appendix A. The failure events for the EPS are listed in Table A.l with a 
brief description of the component function or failure effect. The event number correlates 
to the event number listed in the fault tree. 
1. Minimum Cut Sets 
There are 125 minimum cut sets listed in Table A.2 for the EPS. The number of cut 
sets is not necessarily a significant measure of a systems architectural resistance to 
failure. The level of detail for which the analysis is conducted is directly proportional to 
the size of the analysis elements derived from the architecture. Table A.l list the failure 
events or components that were considered to be relevant to the study objective. Many 
EPS circuits could have been analyzed to increasing detail which would have increased 
the quantity and size of minimum cut sets. For example, during an iteration of 
constructing a fault tree for the EPS, a fault tree was constructed which analyzed the 
electronic power switches in the EPS down to each discrete component level. This 
sizable fault tree produced over 850 minimum cut sets. Although further detailed 
analysis could have been conducted on the fault tree, listing many failure points, the 
effective analysis is no different for the designer than just considering a single end event 
failure (e.g., switch component failure) for a particular switch. There are many similar 
examples in the design architecture. The appropriate reduction of the fault tree allowed 
the analyst to reduce the minimum cut set generation to a more reasonable and 
analytically more germane size. The largest minimum cut set for the EPS portion of the 
fault tree consisted of four failure events. 
The current version of the FaultrEASE FTA software program is rather elementary 
in it's capability to model all conditions. The program did not possess the ability to 
analyze a k-out-of-n structure condition. The single point failure minimum cut sets for 
the solar panels (i.e., Table A.2 minimum cut sets 1-5) only consider a single solar panel. 
Since the number of solar panel failures that would be required in order to cause a critical 
52 
failure is some unknown number k, these failure events would not in reality be single 
point failures as shown in Table A.2, but would constitute a minimum cut set of size k or 
greater. 
The failure events are listed only once in Table A. 1 for convenience, but the actual 
analysis printout lists the event each time it is repeated. Table 2 lists events in the fault 
tree that are repeated a number times at various locations within the tree. The number of 
times the event is referenced could also be an indication of the relative importance of the 
failure events occurrence.   Events 1.134 through 1.135 for example refer to failure events 
that could cause a failure of the +5 volt power supply. As will be discussed later, this 
power supply is a very important circuit in the EPS architecture. All other failure events 
were listed only once. 
References to failure events for the remainder of this section refer to the numbers 
used in Table A.l and correlate to the respective event numbers on the fault tree. All 
references to minimum cut set numbers are those used in Table A.2. 
Event # Event # Event # Event # 
1.16 3 1.24 6 1.131 15 1.135 15 
1.17 3 1.25 6 1.132 15 1.136 15 
1.18 3 1.26 6 1.133 15 1.137 15 
1.19 3 1.130 15 1.134 15 1.250 2 
Table 2. EPS Multiple Failure Event Listings 
2. Single Point Failures 
Single point failure events are the most significant failure event sets when 
analyzing the system design for structural reliability. A minimum cut set of size 1 
constitutes a single point failure since only that failure event is require to cause the Top 
Event. The following single point failures are significant to the EPS architecture. 
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a. +5 Volt Power Supply 
The +5 volt power supply is one of the most crucial circuits in the EPS design 
architecture. This circuit provides power for the majority of logic and control circuits on 
the spacecraft, including those within the EPS. A parallel redundant power supply is 
integrated into the circuit design in a warm standby configuration, to instantaneously 
assume the load in the event of a power supply failure. The current design circuit 
however does suffer from the possibility of incurring a failure scenario which the failure 
of one power supply could cause the failure of the second power supply. This is referred 
to as a contingency redundancy failure and is listed as event 1.110. The two parallel 
power supplies are connected at the emitters of the power supply output bipolar junction 
transistor (BJT) from each power supply chip. The collector for each BJT is connected to 
the raw power bus via a fuse and common input filter. An emitter to collector short for 
either BJT coupled with the failure of the power supply input fuse to blow for such 
occurrence (separate fuse for each power supply) would place raw bus power on the +5 
volt bus. The consequences of such an occurrence are several, but all result in the failure 
of the logic circuits to operate correctly. 
Table 2 lists failure events relating to a +5 volt power supply failure to be 
repeated 15 times in the fault tree structure. Failure events for a +5 volt power supply 
failure are listed as minimum cut sets 11 through 17. 
b. Peripheral Control Bus (PCB) 
The PCB is a system circuit which is critical for the operation of each of the 
hardware subsystems analyzed. Responsible for distribution of power, control signals, 
and data traffic throughout the spacecraft, it has the capability to become a reliability 
weak link in the system design. With no circuit redundancy for the PCB, almost any 
single component failure of the circuit could negate the operation and function of every 
relevant circuit in the spacecraft. The PCB circuit consists of a bus (wire bundle) 
connecting each subsystem or peripheral component (Fig. A.9), each of which contain 
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interface circuits for power distribution and data connectivity. Failure events for the PCB 
are listed as minimum cut sets 19-21 and 32-35. 
c. Solar Panels 
Eight of the 17 solar panels are used for the solar panel illumination experiment 
(SPIE). Each of these solar panels connect to their individual current sensor (minimum 
cut set number 1). There are several possible current sensor component failures which 
could fail in a mode which prevent passing current from the SPIE solar panel to the raw 
power bus. All 17 solar panels are connected in parallel to supply the raw power bus 
through the common master current sensor (minimum cut set number 31). The master 
current sensor is identical to the SPIE current sensors. 
It has not been determined exactly how many solar panel failures are necessary 
to prevent operations as previously discussed. The tumbling motion of the spacecraft 
complicates the determination of effective solar panel operation or failure. Computer 
simulations have been written to resemble spacecraft motion and the effective solar flux 
area [Ref. 10]. The initial failure simulations have been completed analyzing for solar 
panel failure combinations of size 1 or 2 failed solar panels with the results summarized 
in Table 3. The effective solar flux area listed is the lowest minimum average for the 
failed panel orientation to the sun. The power calculations are based upon a 17.1 Watt 














1 908 8.2 15.7 1.4 
2 831 15.98 14.37 2.7 
Table 3. Solar Panel Failure Effects 
Each solar panel has a single blocking diode (minimum cut sets 2 and 4) on the 
connection from the solar panel to the EPS power board. An open diode would prevent 
power distribution from the solar panel to the raw power bus.   A solar panel consist of 32 
series connected solar cells. If the panel string integrity is broken (i.e., inter-cell 
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connections or a cell failure), the entire solar panel is rendered useless (minimum cut sets 
3 and 5). 
d. Control Signals 
The operation and commanding of the electronic power switches used in the 
EPS to distribute the unregulated raw power to the various subsystems is a crucial part of 
the EPS design. The command signal contains two parts, the switch address and 
command orders to turn the switch on or off. There are two issues to examine when 
analyzing how a valid command from the DCS could be misinterpreted at the destination 
address. These issues are command addressing and command signal errors. The 
command addressing issue consider how a valid signal address from the DCS is 
mis-routed or modified in-routed to the destination. The most likely cause of this type of 
error might be the PCB interface address registers, U17 or U18 on the EPS logic board or 
a failure of the command signaling path from the PCB interface registers to the switches. 
The command signaling issue concerns the signal distortion or modification due to a 
transient condition or circuit malfunction. A recovery from a transient condition may be 
possible, but a malfunction which places the system in a posture in which ground station 
intervention is not possible would cause a critical failure. For example a circuit 
malfunction which cause power to be secured to the RF system when the DCS expected 
something entirely different like a battery placed on service, would leave the system 
orbiting without the ability to receive ground instructions. This problem is further 
complicated by the inability of the DCS to determine if the signal it has commanded has 
been accomplished as ordered. The DCS only has the capability to command switches, 
and has no way to directly read the position of the switch (i.e., on or off). Failure events 
for the control issues are lists as minimum cut sets 36 and 37. 
e. EPS Logic Board 
The EPS logic board can be thought of as the workhorse of the EPS. The logic 
board conducts the commands received from the DCS for power switching, power 
measurements, and WDT resets. Single point failures of the logic board pertain to the 
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ability to route the correct DCS commands and WDT reset signals. Minimum cut sets 21, 
25, 26, and 38-46 will prevent command signals from reaching their destination. The 
WDT and the circuits used to reset it are listed as minimum cut sets 18, 21-30, 32,40, 43, 
and 46. The logic board is designed almost exclusively using integrated chips (IC) with 
very few discrete components. Analyzing the logic board to the component level (i.e., IC 
level) there is virtually no component which is not a single point failure. The high 
threshold detector failure (failed high) would prevent any reset command from resetting 
the WDT. The purpose of the high threshold detector is to prevent the cyclic resetting of 
the WDT when there is a low voltage condition on the +5 volt power bus until the bus 
becomes stable. The most likely time this would come into play is during spacecraft 
initialization. The low threshold detector (fail low) would maintain logic components 
U21, U22, U25, U26, and U27 in a initialization condition (i.e., unable to apply power to 
mass storage, TMUX, RF, antenna release circuit, or battery switch operations). Any 
failure which causes the output of U27 (D flip-flop which signals for power application to 
a DCS) to fail high or low could cause the system to fail. 
/.  Thermal Control 
Since the system is designed without an active thermal control system, all 
temperature sensitive components must rely on accurate thermal analysis. Accurate 
reliability prediction also requires a well defined thermal environment prediction. A 
failure of the passive thermal control system to maintain the spacecraft within it's 
operational boundary limits or the failure of swift ground station operator action to a 
unusual thermal condition can lead to component failures throughout the design structure. 
The battery compartment is sensitive to excessive thermal conditions. If the temperature 
of the battery compartment exceeds the thermal limits, then battery cell plate degradation 
and shortened battery life should be expected. Temperature conditions which exceed the 
thermal limits could cause cell dryout due to excessive cell pressure compromising 
battery seal integrity. Single point failures due to improper thermal control are listed as 
minimum cut sets 6, 7, and 8. 
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g. Battery Monitor 
The battery monitor is responsible for maintaining an accurate estimation of the 
condition of the on-board batteries. A failure of the monitor to maintain a precise 
prediction could cause the operation of a battery outside its preferred operating envelope. 
This could lead to a shortened battery lifetime. A failure of the battery cell voltage and 
current sensing circuits could cause the battery monitor to make incorrect estimations. If 
the respective sensors, addressing registers, or multiplexers were to fail the battery 
monitor would receive inaccurate data. This is listed as minimum cut sets 9 and 10. 
3. Double Point Failures 
As the minimum cut set size increases, the systems reliability structural also 
becomes more favorable. There are three EPS circuits which exhibit minimum cut sets of 
event size two. These are the launch switches, WDT, and storage batteries. 
a. Launch Switches 
The launch switches, as presently designed, are configured in two parallel strings 
of two series connected switches (Fig. A.l). Such a design generates a minimum cut set 
list that consist of failure combinations of one switch from each parallel leg (minimum 
cut sets 47-50). The four minimum cut set combinations are listed as minimum cut sets 
47-50. 
b. Battery 
The two parallel storage batteries generate a list of double point failures. Each 
battery consist of a number of single point failures, but when the battery system is 
considered as a combination of both batteries a double point failure circuit is generated. 
Battery testing is currently in progress to determine battery operating characteristics. The 
failure events listed for the batteries are failure event types common to Ni-Cd batteries. 
Minimum cut sets 47-99 list the battery double point failures. 
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c. WDT 
The most critical portion of the WDT is the D flip-flop which switches power to 
the respective DCS. As previously discussed as a single point failure, if U27:A fails then 
the system fails. This single point failure can also be described as a double point failure 
in which both outputs (Q and Q bar) fail to a low condition. This is listed as minimum 
cut set 105. It is also possible for U27:A to fail in a condition in which both outputs fail 
to a high condition (minimum cut set 104). If this condition exists, then power is 
continuously applied to both DCS A and DCS B. The respective DCS have no means to 
communicate with each other. If one DCS is operating it assumes it is the only DCS that 
is functioning.   This can cause fatal operational control of the spacecraft, with the 
respective DCS's fighting over the systems operations. Scenarios could be easily 
conceived in which the system places itself into a unrecoverable state by one DCS placing 
the system in a given state and the other DCS, assuming a different initial conditions, 
altering the system state to an unrecoverable condition. For example, assume DCS A has 
the system aligned in the following conditions listed in Table 4. 
Then a failure to U27:A occurs and power is additionally applied to DCS B which 
initializes the spacecraft and DCS B re-configures the spacecraft into the listened mode 
described in Table 5 without the detection of DCS A. 
DCS A will remain in a listening mode, but will never receive a signal due to the 
fact the configuration has been modified to send the signal to DCS B. DCS B is in a 
listening mode waiting for NPS connection and operating system upload. When DCS A 
does not receive a signal after a given period of time it will modify it's assumed 
configuration, say switch over to LNA #2, which secures power to LNA #1, applies 
power to LNA #2, and switches RF S2 and RF S4 to LNA #2. Now no signal will be 
received by DCS B, for which it will modify the system configuration. This cycle could 
continue indefinitely. 
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EPS DCS A RF 
Batt. A on-line switch 
closed 
DCS A receive segment 
lined up to RF 
Power applied to LNA #1 
circuit 
RF power switch on RF S1 selected to receive 
TMUX A/TMUX B power 
switch closed 
RF S2 selected to LNA 
#1 
Ant. Deployment 1 and 2 
power switches open 
RF S4 selected to receive 
from LNA #1 
MASS A and B power 
switches closed 
RF S5 selected to receive 
mixer 
All battery charge and 
discharge switches open 
RF S6 selected to receive 
mixer 
WDT U27:A output to 
DCS A 
RF S7 selected to receive 
RF S8 selected to DCS A 
receive 
Table 4. DCS A System Configuration 
EPS DCSB RF 
Battery A on-line switch 
closed 
DCS B receive segment 
lined up to RF 
Power applied to LNA #1 
circuit 
RF power switch on RF S1 selected to receive 
TMUX A and TMUX B 
power switch closed 
RF S2 selected to LNA 
#1 
Ant. Deployment 1 and 2 
power switches open 
RF S4 selected to receive 
from LNA #1 
MASS A and B power 
switches closed 
RF S5 selected to receive 
mixer 
All battery charge and 
discharge switches open 
RF S6 selected to receive 
mixer 
WDT U27:A output to 
DCSB 
RF S7 selected to receive 
RF S8 selected to DCS B 
receive 
Table 5. DCS B System Configuration 
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Another critical system operation could occur in the mass storage devices with the 
competing DCS microprocessors' overwriting essential data used for the other micro- 
processor specific computations. 
4. Triple Point Failures 
a. Solar Panels 
The structural reliability of the solar panels have been increased by adding a 
second line from the solar panels to the EPS power bus, both for the line and return lines. 
There are fuses at each end of the power lines to prevent a fault (i.e., power line to ground 
short) from grounding out the solar panel and/or the raw power bus. This design 
generates the minimum cut sets 103-110. There in actuality would be 8 minimum cut sets 
for each solar panel, but only one solar panel was included in the fault tree due to 
software limitations. 
b. Battery 
Blocking diodes on the output of each battery prevent uncontrolled battery 
charging. If the diodes were to open then no current could flow from the battery to the 
raw power bus. Increased structural reliability was accomplished by placing two diodes 
in parallel on the output of each battery. Minimum cut sets of size 3 are therefore found 
by having both diodes of one battery fail concurrent with a critical failure in the other 
battery. These are listed as minimum cut sets 111-124. 
5. Quadruple Point Failures 
a. Battery 
As discussed above, both batteries have two blocking diodes in parallel on their 
output. Therefore one possible failure scenario is if all four diodes were to fail open. 
This is minimum cut set 125. 
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6. Improvements 
During the process of synthesizing the fault tree for the EPS several design 
modifications have been made which have increased the subsystem reliability. These 
issues, along with some further suggestions, are discussed here to provoke further thought 
in design enhancement considerations. 
a. Launch Switches 
The PANSAT design exceeds the safety requirement mandated by NASA with 
the use of the parallel launch switch design (Fig. A.l) for launch from the space shuttle. 
The NASA requirement stipulates two series connected switches to prevent powering up 
the system and possible radiation of electro-magnetic energy from the satellites 
communication subsystem while still in the shuttle cargo bay. The parallel switch design 
effectively doubles the reliability of the launch switch circuit. Further analysis has 
revealed that the circuit reliability can be further strengthened at no cost or major design 
modifications. Figure 21 illustrates the modification of the present design by placing a 
single wire between the junctions of the series connected switches. The NASA 






Figure 21. Alternate Launch Switch Configuration 
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The current design results in four minimum cut sets of size two failure events. 
The alternate configuration (Fig. 21) results in a much more stringent launch switch 
configuration design. The minimum cut sets for the alternate design are listed in Table 6. 
The event type "circle" refers to a basic component failure, in this case it is the launch 
switch failure in the open position. 
The system structure functions for the launch switch circuits can be derived 
using equations 10 and 11 to the current and alternate launch switch configurations 
shown below. If the switches are assumed to be independent and identical then the 
reliability function can also be derived. Functions with a subscript of the letter C are a 
reflection of the current launch switch design configuration, and those subscripted by the 
letter A relate to the alternate configuration. Derivation of the following results are 
similar to the example problems provided in Chapter III. 
(1) Current Configuration 
Kl =SiIJsi3; K2 = SiIJsi4; K3=S2ÖS13; K4=S2IJsi4 
4 
<Ms) = n Ki = SiS2 + S13S14 -SiS2Si3Si4 
i=l 
hc(P) = P1P2 + P13P14 " P1P2P13P14 = 2P2 - P4 
Ihc(i) = ~a    = P - P3 (Since all switches are assumed identical) 
(2) Alternate Configuration 
Ki =siXJsi3; K2 = s2Usi4 
0A(s) = SiS2 + SiSi4 + S2Si3 + Si3Si4-SiS2Si3-SiS2Si4-SiSi3Si4-S2Si3Si4 + SiS2Si3Si, 
hA(p) = 4p2-4p3 + P4 
IhA(i) = 2p-3p2+p3 
If the alternate configuration is more reliable, then the reliability function for the 
alternate configuration must be greater than the reliability function for the current 






hA(p) = 4p2-4p3+p4^2p2-p4 = hc(p) 
2p2 - 4p3 + 2p4 >0 
2p2(p2-2p+l)>0 
2p2(p - 1)2> 0 for all 0<p< 1 
Min Cut Set Min Cut Set 
Size 
Event Type Description 
1 2 events CIRCLE S2 Failure 
CIRCLE S14 Failed 
2 2 events CIRCLE S1 Failure 
CIRCLE S13 Failed 
3 3 events CIRCLE S13 Failure 
CIRCLE S1 Failure 
CIRCLE S14 Failed 
4 3 events CIRCLE S13 Failure 
CIRCLE S1 Failure 
CIRCLE S2 Failed 
5 3 events CIRCLE S14 Failure 
CIRCLE S2 Failure 
CIRCLE S1 Failed 
6 3 events CIRCLE S14 Failure 
CIRCLE S2 Failure 
CIRCLE S13 Failed 
Table 6. Alternative Launch Switch Configuration Minimum Cut Sets 
Therefore the alternate configuration is more reliable at the cost of a small 
wire connecting the switches. The ratio of the reliability functions will give a good 
indication of the relative value of the alternate configuration. As the individual switch 
reliability (p) approaches one, the ratio also approaches one. 
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hA(p)_4p2-4p3+p4_(p-2)/ 
hc(p)        2p2-4p4 2-p2 
ft.    Blocking Diodes 
(1) Battery Blocking Diodes. A preceding EPS design used one output 
blocking diode from each battery to the raw power bus. Using an approach similar to the 
above, it can be shown the reliability for the blocking diode circuit increases from a value 
of p to a value of 2p-p2.   This will increase the reliability of the diode circuit for all 
reliability values p. 
(2) Solar Panel Blocking Diodes. The approach to dual blocking diodes used 
for the battery can also be applied to the solar panel and elsewhere in the EPS design 
where appropriate space availability exist. This is a critical component for the solar 
panels and could be incorporated into the design at a relatively low cost. 
c. Power Switching Control Circuits 
The power switching logic circuits on the EPS logic board are single point 
failure items for the system.   The distribution of load assignments to the power switching 
control registers, U21 and U22, are shown in Fig. A.3. All similar type loads are 
controlled off the same register. The failure of one register would prevent the use of both 
redundant subsystem circuits. The loads for U21, for example, control all the switches 
for charging, discharging, and placing on-line both batteries. If U21 were to fail, then no 
battery switch would be functional, and would cause a critical failure. In order to help 
reduce the possibility of a single point upset by the failure of one register, like subsystem 
components should be controlled off separate registers (i.e., MASS A controlled by U21 
with MASS B controlled by U22). Additionally, all the switches for a particular battery 
must be controlled off the same register to prevent a similar type failure scenario with the 
present design. 
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Consideration for failure modes which place the spacecraft in a configuration in 
which two-way communication with the satellite is not possible should be addressed in 
the operating system architecture. To prevent the spacecraft from re-configuring to a 
failed alignment, particularly after an upsetting event has caused a system 
re-initialization, a log of the systems configuration should be maintained within the flash 
memory of the mass storage devices. 
The ability to verify system commands could be beneficial to the satellites self 
diagnostics capability and a basis for critical failure mode prevention. If the satellite 
possessed the ability to recognize the systems failure to correctly respond to commands it 
has ordered, it could re-configure to an acceptable configuration before a critical failure 
event has occured, and allow further analysis to be conducted by the ground station. 
d. Antenna Deployment Circuitry 
Detailed failure analysis of the communication signal beam pattern has not been 
studied for a failure scenario in which a portion or all of the antenna circuits' four dipole 
antennas fail to release. A second power switch was added to the design to help ensure 
the deployment of the antennas. The additional switch feeds a common antenna 
deployment circuit consisting of heaters to burn the antenna restraints. A failure in the 
antenna deployment circuit would still prevent a controlled antenna release. A 
deployment circuit with parallel switches connected in this configuration also risks the 
possibility of a contingency redundancy failure of the switches. True circuit redundancy 
is only possible if the circuits are independent of each other. 
e. Solar Panel Wiring And Fusing 
Redundant power lines (both supply and return) from the solar panels to the EPS 
power board have been added to prevent the break in one line from isolating a solar panel. 
Additionally, fuses at each end of the supply line are provided to prevent a short from 
grounding out the panel. 
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/.  Power Switch Fusing 
Fuses at the input of each power switch, with the exception of the RF power 
switch, have been added to prevent a short in a subsystem grounding out the entire 
spacecraft power bus. 
g. +5 Volt Power Supply 
The +5 volt power supply performs a crucial role in the performance of the 
spacecraft. Used for most control circuits, it's failure in any way will cause a critical 
failure. Minimum cut sets relating to the +5 volt power supply failure was listed 
conservatively 16 times for the EPS portion of the fault tree alone. Although there is a 
redundant power supply, the susceptibility of the design to a contingency redundancy 
failure should not be overlooked. Further analysis, using quantitative analysis, is 
necessary to validate the power design configuration. 
h. PCB 
The PCB is the vital communication and power distribution link between the 
subsystems and peripherals. A single failure (e.g., break in a power line from the EPS) 
could permanently secure operations. Short of making a redundant PCB, which defeats 
the compact design of the PCB, only stringent quality control of the PCB fabrication and 
installation can help minimized the failure of the physical bus. Although the PCB 
interface circuits are radiation hardened, there is no redundancy provided for any circuit 
interface. 
L   WDT 
Any failure condition of the WDT, particularly Ul and U27:A, will result in a 
critical failure. If the circuit was to fail in a condition in which both DCS A and DCS B 
are powered, then the system must be intelligent enough to detect and responded in a 
manner to maintain the system operational. One possible solution is to reserve a given 
memory location in the mass storage devices for the operational DCS to access. If a DCS 
is functioning, then it would periodically read that memory location contents for it's 
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unique identification flag. If the memory location did not possess it's flag, but instead 
contained the flag of the other DCS, as would be the case if both DCS were accessing the 
location, then it would reset the flag. If the flag had been altered at the time of it's next 
access, it would then go into a standby condition and allow the other DCS to control the 
spacecraft. This standby mode, for example, could be the continuous calculation of the 
value of pi to keep the microprocessor busy. The other DCS must also detect the other 
DCS status and make that report in the telemetry stream to the ground station. 
j.  Battery 
The battery must be periodically reconditioned using controlled battery 
discharge and charging procedures. This will increase battery lifetime and also result in 
resetting the battery monitor to a known condition of battery status. 
B.     RF 
The RF subsystem fault tree was constructed utilizing the block diagram (Fig. B.l). 
The respective switch designations (i.e., RF SI through RF S9) are unique to this analysis 
only. These may not correlate to the designations used by the subsystem designer in 
future schematics. The RF subsystem is designed with redundant circuits and selective 
switching circuits to route the signals. This makes the application of the signal routing 
switches the critical failure points for the design. The reliability of the switching circuits 
and the control system must be carefully evaluated to ensure the reliability of the system 
is actually enhanced by the use of similar redundant systems. 
The analysis data derived from the fault tree for the RF subsystem is contained in 
appendix B. The failure events for the RF subsystem are listed in Table B.l with a brief 
description of the component function or failure effect. The event numbers correlate to 
the event number listed on the leaves of the fault tree. 
1. Minimum Cut Sets 
There are 114 minimum cut sets (Table B.2) for the RF subsystem portion of the 
fault tree. Minimum cut sets of size 1 (single point failures) contribute to 90 of the 114 
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minimum cut sets. The majority of the event types are listed as a "diamond" event (Fig. 
15), as described in Chapter III. This indicates that further evaluation of the event is 
possible but is not conducted here. This may be due to the fact no additional information 
could be derived by further breaking down the design, the immaturity of the design, or 
due to analysis time limitations. 
2. Single Point Failures 
The prevalent single point failure events involved the signal routing switches in the 
RF subsystem, from the antenna to the respective portions of a DCS modem. The other 
single point failure events consider antenna and power supply failure scenarios. 
a. Signal Routing Switches 
There are 63 single point failures corresponding to the switch operations alone. 
There are 7 single point failure events listed for each of the 9 RF signal routing switches. 
The issues concerning a switch failure include switch component failures, command bus 
failures, command addressing logic failures, command signal format problems, and 
power distribution from the respective power buses to the circuits. The failure events for 
RF switch #3 (Fig. B. 1), for example, are listed as minimum cut sets 11-17. Two of the 
switches, RF S1 and RF S2, are mechanical switches and thus subject to the additional 
failure mode of mechanical wear. The switch failure events themselves have not been 
addressed in significant detail due to time constraints. 
Since the signal routing switches are common and necessary option for parallel 
circuit operation with the given design, they could also be listed as a part of a double 
point failure minimum cut set. This is because the switch failure position can be one of 
several modes. It could fail in a condition in which it could not route the signal in either 
direction (i.e., RF S2 could not route signal to LNA #1 or LNA #2), in which it would be 
a single point failure. The switch could also fail in a condition in which it could only 
route the signal through one path (i.e., LNA #1) so that an additional critical failure event 
in the path selected by the failed switch would be required for a critical failure. 
Additionally, if the switch was common to both the receive and transmit circuits (i.e., RF 
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S1, RF S4, RF S5, RF S6, or RF S7) then it's failure may diminish the satellite to a given 
operational function (i.e., transmit or receive). If that were true, then the system would be 
functionally inoperable, lending itself as a critical failure. 
b. Antenna 
The critical failure events associated with the antenna circuits, which include the 
antenna, impedance matching transformers, interconnections, and the bandpass filter, 
consider the events which diminish the communication signal to noise ratio. Minimum 
cut sets 32-45, 54, and 55 are concerned with signal grounding, degraded signal path 
characteristics, and component failures. For the antenna circuit the key to it's successful 
operation is inherent to quality fabrication and system interface. 
c. Power Supply 
The RF subsystem electrical power concerns are associated with the distribution 
of power from the PCB interface for the RF subsystem. Using both power from the +5 
volt bus for PCB interface and command signal processing, the local +5 volt bus is as 
important to the RF subsystem as it was to the EPS. 
Raw power from the EPS is locally conditioned (regulated) for use by the RF 
subsystem components. A critical failure event to the local power buses will cause a 
system failure. 
3. Double Point Failures 
There are 24 minimum cut sets consisting of 2 failure events for the RF subsystem. 
Since there are only a few circuits which constituted the subsystem, and most circuits are 
redundant, there are only a few double point failures listed for this analysis. 
a. Antenna Deployment 
The failure of the antenna to properly deploy, whether it be during controlled 
deployment efforts during the launch and initialization phase or fails to manually deploy 
following, may be a critical failure mode. Detailed analysis of antenna beam patterns 
with the dipole antennas housed, or partially deployed, must be conducted to determined 
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if a sufficient signal to noise ratio can be supported. Minimum cut set number 102 list 
low battery power a causation for the antenna failing to release. This may not actually be 
a viable cause since battery power is not relied upon as a power source for antenna 
deployment. 
b. Amplifiers 
There are two HPA circuits, each consisting of two cascaded power amplifiers. 
Any two combinations of a amplifier from each HPA will prevent signal transmission. 
These are listed as minimum cut sets 91-95. 
Each of the two LNA's contain one amplifier circuit. This requires both LNA's 
to fail, or one LNA failure coupled with an associated switch, RF S2 or RF S4, failure. 
c. Intermediate Frequency (IF) Circuits 
The signal conversion from pass band to IF, or vice versa, takes place in one of 
two frequency conversion circuits. Each circuit consist of a signal mixer and dedicated 
local oscillator (LO). The LO can prevent operations by either component failure or 
significant frequency drift. 
4. Improvements 
The prevalent concern from a reliability structure of the RF subsystem originates 
with the signal routing structure. Both component and command signaling concerns 
dominate the signal path issues. Although it is not easy to expose the true reliability 
weakness of the design without assigning quantitative values, a more reliable system may 
be one which consist of only a few necessary switches. 
C.     DCS 
The DCS was the subsystem which received the least attention due to time 
limitations. The analysis therefore should not in the least be considered detailed or 
complete. All the data derived for the DCS portion can be found in appendix C. The 
system failure events, listed in Table C.l, are not at all detailed, considering only very 
generic failure scenarios. There are 55 minimum cut sets for the DCS and are listed in 
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Table C.2. A block diagram (Fig. C. 1) was used to construct the DCS portion of the fault 
tree. 
Since the fault tree was constructed at a very generic level, the majority of the 
failure events result in single point failure conditions. There are 54 single point failures 
listed for the DCS. Each failure event is a circuit malfunction.   There is one double point 
failure and it refers to the peripheral mass storage device failures. 
A more thorough analysis of the DCS is required to generate any constructive 
analysis data which has not yet been already discussed in the previous sections. 
72 
V. SUMMARY 
Sound system management requires the exploitation of all relevant analytical 
capabilities to ensure the most reliable system is deployed. Essential to the design 
architecture of any system is the effort to minimize all system failure modes. The 
principal theme of this thesis has been to identify the critical failure modes for the 
PANSAT EPS, DCS, and RF subsystems using fault tree analysis to permit architectural 
modifications that are essential to meeting the systems operational lifetime requirements. 
Continuous maintenance of the fault tree is required if it is to be of continuing 
benefit in the design process and helpful in explaining the cause of system anomalies 
during test and flight. 
Significant weak points in the design have been identified and should be the topic 
of further design modifications and analysis. This will require further detailed modeling 
and assessment efforts. 
A.     SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analytical efforts discussed in chapter 4 indicate the design concerns which 
should be considered. The most prevalent questions that require attention follow: 
1. The +5 volt power supply reliability and its susceptibility to a contingent 
failure are of great concern. This critical circuit effects each subsystem in a very 
critical manner. Detailed analysis of the present design, as well as alternative 
designs should be evaluated to enhance the circuits reliability. 
2. The PCB is the artery that supports the entire spacecraft. If it is severed in any 
manner, then the spacecraft is sure to experience a critical failure. 
3. Command switching operations are a necessary function of the system due to 
the design structure. The EPS and RF subsystems both rely upon intelligent 
switching operations to complete their mission. The system is not presently 
capable of making an informed evaluation of its state (i.e., switch positions). 
Consequently, historical command data must be relied upon to reconfigure the 
spacecraft for each operation. 
4. The EPS logic board consists of circuits with no redundancy. Almost without 
exception each component could cause a critical failure. Circuits that perform 
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redundant operations should not be linked, if all possible, through a single point 
failure. For example, redundant components should not be addressed through the 
same addressing register for switch control operations. 
5. The launch switch circuit, in its present configuration, constitutes a system that 
has an equivalent minimum cut set representation of size two event elements. 
Although this is more structurally secure than the single point failure events, it has 
been proven that at the cost of a short wire the circuit can be made more reliable. 
6. The energy storage batteries being flown aboard the spacecraft are not space 
qualified. It is important for the endurance and survivability of the batteries that 
they be operated within operational bounds and placed on a stringent maintenance 
schedule. 
7. Detailed evaluation of all switches, both mechanical and electronic, should be 
carefully studied to determine their respective reliability. For a given system it 
may be more appropriate to simplify the design and not rely upon sophisticated 
signal routing. 
8. Testing and subsystem integration procedures are important elements to help 
minimize some of the failure events listed in the fault tree. Assessment of 
external stresses (i.e., structural and thermal stress) upon the spacecraft, and the 
order of their occurrence, can have dramatic effect on the system reliability 
performance. An example of such stress would be thermal expansion that causes 
broken component leads and connections. Thermal excursions can affect the 
reliability of components, and must be considered when evaluating the 
components reliability. Stress screen testing, typically performed by the vendor, 
of electronic components is an effective tool to minimize electronic circuit 
component failures. 
B.     SYSTEM RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT 
A severe weak point in the PANS AT program has been its cursory approach to 
reliability analysis. The absence of a coherent reliability program that supports the design 
process has resulted in a program with no analytical basis. This would not be permitted 
in any commercial or defense contractor program. 
This thesis has been the lead reliability analysis of the program, and has occurred at 
a late stage of the systems design lifecycle. There are numerous publications that outline 
how a reliability program is incorporated into a systems design and operational cycle. 
Several military standard (MIL-STD) publications are available that deal directly with the 
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programmatic structure a reliability program should embrace. These are briefly discussed 
to promote further thought by systems management personnel. 
1. Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment Development and 
Production (MIL -STD-785) 
This standard provides the general requirements and specific tasks for reliability 
programs during the development, production, and initial deployment of systems and 
equipment [Ref. 11]. Designed for use by Department of Defense (DoD) contractors, it 
provides the guidelines for effectively designing, managing control, and reliability 
maintenance essential for a reliability program. 
2. Reliability Program Requirements for Space and Launch Vehicles 
(MIL-STD-1543) 
This standard is similar to MIL-STD-785 but is tailored specifically for the DoD 
space systems contractor. Detailed requirements of reliability design reviews, reliability 
modeling requirements, testing, and corrective action review boards are provided to 
integrate the reliability and design processes [Ref. 12]. 
3. Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(MIL-STD-1629) 
This standard establishes the requirements and procedures to perform a failure 
mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA). This tool could be used to 
systematically evaluate and document the potential impact of each functional and 
hardware failure on mission success, safety, performance, maintainability, and 
maintenance requirements [Ref. 13]. The use of FMECA is typically used as a 
management and reliability assessment tool for program design reviews. 
C.     FOLLOW ON STUDY 
The need for reliability analysis assessment has become increasingly evident as the 
thesis effort has progressed. Several issues that need to be explored for the PANSAT 
program and any follow on program are listed below: 
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1. More detailed analysis of specific subsystems and circuits is required. 
Although a significant amount of analytical information was uncovered, only the 
ground work has begun on this topic. There is an abundant amount of data that 
could be investigated to enhance the design process. 
2. A detailed reliability management plan should be created and complied with in 
order to head off problems early in the design cycle. This will help ensure that 
key reliability issues are addressed right from the programs inception. This goal 
could expand the realm of the programs involvement to include students and staff 
from the Operations Research Department (OR), where experience and 
involvement in similar programs dealing with these types of issues are in progress. 
3. As the design reaches maturity, a quantitative analysis modeling of the system 
could provide useful insights to the missions reliability state. 
4. The fault tree constructed for this thesis must be continuously updated and 
built upon as the design changes and matures. It is strongly recommended that 
this task be assigned to a program engineer. 
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APPENDIX A. ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM 
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
This appendix contains the raw data for the FTA of the EPS. Figures A. 1 through 
A.9 are EPS schematic diagrams. The EPS failure end events are listed in Table A. 1 and 
Table A.2 lists the EPS minimum cut sets generated by the FaultrEASE fault tree 
software program for the PANSAT fault tree in Appendix D. 
The minimum cut sets were generated using a direct evaluation technique employed 
by the fault tree software program. The basic end events were compared by their 
description label contents. 
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Figure A.2 EPS +5 Volt Power Supplies 
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Figure A.4 EPS Electronic Power Switching Circuits 
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Figure A.6 EPS Electronic Power Switching Circuits (continued) 
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Figure A.8 EPS Current Sensing Circuit 
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Event Description Notes 
1.1 Experimental Current 
Sensor Failure 
A current sensor is located between the solar panel 
and the launch switches for each of the 8 solar panels 
in the solar panel illumination experiment (SPIE). 
1.2 Experimental Connection 
Broken 
Broken power connection from an SPIE solar panel 
to the raw power bus. 
1.3 Experimental Line 1 SP 
Fuse Blows 
Blown line 1 fuse at the SPIE solar panel end 
(connection of each solar panel is made with two 
separate lines, with each line having two fuses, one at 
the solar panel end and one at the EPS raw bus end). 
1.4 Experimental Line 1 EPS 
Fuse Blows 
Blown line 1 fuse at the SPIE EPS end. 
1.5 Experimental Line 2 SP 
Fuse Blows 
Blown line 2 fuse at the SPIE solar panel end. 
1.6 Experimental Line 2 EPS 
Fuse Blows 
Blown line 2 fuse at the SPIE EPS end. 
1.7 Experimental S/P 
Blocking Diode Fails 
Open 
Each SPIE solar panel has a blocking diode 
connecting the solar panel to the EPS raw power bus 
to prevent reverse current flow through a non-power 
producing solar panel. If the diode fails open then no 
power would be available from the solar panel. 
1.8 Experimental Panel String 
Broken 
Each SPIE solar panel consist of 32 series connected 
solar cells. If the connections between the cells or a 
cell fails open then the solar panel is ineffective. 
1.9 Connection Broken Same as 1.2 for remaining solar panels. 
1.10 Line 1 SP Fuse Blows Same as 1.3 for remaining solar panels. 
1.11 Line 1 EPS Fuse Blows Same as 1.4 for remaining solar panels. 
1.12 Line 2 SP Fuse Blows Same as 1.5 for remaining solar panels. 
1.13 Line 2 EPS Fuse Blows Same as 1.6 for remaining solar panels. 
1.14 Solar Panel Blocking 
Diode Fails Open 
Same as 1.7 for remaining solar panels. 
1.15 Panel String Broken Same as 1.8 for remaining solar panels. 
1.16 SI Failed Launch switch connecting the solar panels and 
batteries to the raw power bus. 
1.17 S13 Failure Launch switch connecting the solar panels and 
batteries to the raw power bus. 
1.18 S14 Failure Launch switch connecting the solar panels and 
batteries to the raw power bus. 
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1.19 S2 Failed Launch switch connecting the solar panels and 
batteries to the raw power bus. 
1.20 Batt A Cell 
Inter-connection Broken 
Broken connection between the 10 series connected 
type D Ni-Cd battery cells comprising battery A. 
1.21 Batt A Cell Internal 
Connection Broken 
Broken power connection internal to each type D 
Ni-Cd cell (e.g., between battery plates and the cell 
terminals). 
1.22 Batt A Cell Reversal Battery cell condition where the cell becomes a powei 
load and causes cell polarity reversal. 
1.23 Batt A Plate Degradation Battery cell plate degradation to point the cell is not 
able to hold a charge. 
1.24 Faulty Temp Sensing 
System (TMUX) 
A temperature sensing circuit failure could cause a 
battery over temperature condition. If the 
temperature becomes high enough battery explosion 
or pressure seal blow-by could occur. 
1.25 Improper Passive Thermal 
Control 
Battery box thermal conditions exceed expected 
conditions due to improper passive thermal control 
and cause event conditions of 1.24. 
1.26 Insufficient Operator 
Action 
Ground control operation fail to take timely actions to 
correct improper battery thermal conditions causing 
high temperature operations (this may be a flag to a 
separate event failure). 
1.27 Batt A Improper Charge 
Rates 
If batteries are not maintained in accordance with 
operating specifications for charging and discharging 
rates, then battery life could be severely shortened. 
1.28 Substandard seal 
construction 
Poor battery seal could cause leakage or electrolyte 
blow-by during battery gassing evolutions and 
evaporation causing cell dry out (failure). 
1.29 Battery Monitor Failure If battery monitor fails to maintain an effective status 
measurement of battery conditions then continuous 
battery over-charge cycles will reduce battery lifetime 
1.30 Blocking Diode D9 Fails 
Open 
Battery A has two output blocking diodes (parallel 
redundancy) to prevent uncontrolled battery charging. 
Failure of blocking diodes will prevent placing batter} 
on service. 
1.31 Blocking Diode D20 Fails 
Open 
See event 1.30 
1.32 Battery "A" Current Current sensor failure could prevent current flow 
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Sensor Failure from battery to raw power bus. 
1.33 Batt B Cell 
Interconnection Broken 
See 1.20 
1.34 Batt B Cell Internal 
Connection Broken 
See 1.21 
1.35 Sub-standard Seal 
Construction 
See 1.28 
1.36 Batt B Cell Reversal See 1.22 
1.37 Batt B Plate Degradation See 1.23 
1.38 Batt B Improper Charge 
Rates 
See 1.27 
1.39 Battery Monitor Failure See 1.29 
1.40 Battery "B" Current 
Sensor Failure 
See 1.32 
1.41 Blocking Diode D10 Fails 
Open 
See 1.30 
1.42 Blocking Diode D28 Fails 
Open 
See 1.31 
1.43 Current/Voltage Sensing 
Ckt Failure U25/U26 
Failure would cause the inability to monitor cell 
voltages and battery condition (see 1.29). 
1.44 Batt A Charge Switch 
Fails Shut 
Charge switch failing shut would cause continuous 
battery charging eventually leading to a battery 
over-temperature condition. 
1.45 Batt B Charge Switch 
Fails Shut 
See 1.44 
1.46 Dll Fails Open Each charge switch has two parallel diodes on the 
charge switch battery output side. Diode failure 
prevents recharging battery A. 
1.47 D29 Fails Open See 1.46 
1.48 Broken Connection Power bus failure between switch and the bus. 
1.49 Batt A Chg Switch Input 
Fuse Failure 
Each switch is fused on the input (power line side). 
Fuse failure prevent current flow through the switch. 
1.50 Lossof+5VfromPCB 
to Batt A Chg Control 
No control power for switch operations. 
1.51 Batt A Chg Switch 
Component Failure 
The electronic switches consists of several discrete 
components. Failure of most any of them will cause 
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the switch to fail. 
1.52 Batt A Discharge Switch 
Fails Shut 
Battery continuously discharges (not able to be 
charged although could be taken off line). 
1.53 Batt A Charge Switch Fail 
Shut 
See 1.45 
1.54 Batt A Discharge Switch 
Fail Shut 
See 1.52 
1.55 D18 Fails Open Each charge switch has two parallel diodes on the 
charge switch battery output side. Diode failure 
prevents recharging battery B. 
1.56 D30 Fails Open See 1.55 
1.57 Broken Connection See 1.48 
1.58 Input Fuse Blows See 1.49 
1.59 Loss of+5 V from PCB to 
Batt B Chg Control 
See 1.50 
1.60 Batt B Chg Switch 
Component Failure 
See 1.51 
1.61 Batt B Discharge Switch 
Fails Shut 
See 1.52 
1.62 Batt B Charge Switch Fail 
Shut 
See 1.53 
1.63 Batt B Discharge Switch 
Fail Shut 
See 1.52 
1.64 Broken Connection See 1.48 
1.65 Input Fuse Blows See 1.49 
1.66 Loss of +5 V from PCB to 
S3 Control 
See 1.50 
1.67 Batt A On-line (S3) 
Component Failure 
Failure prevents placing battery A on-line. 
1.68 Broken Connection See 1.48 
1.69 Input Fuse Blows See 1.49 
1.70 Loss of +5 V from PCB to 
S4 Control 
See 1.50 
1.71 Batt B On-line Switch 
(S4) Component Failure 
See 1.67 
1.72 Broken Data Broken bus from the PCB wire bundle to the EPS 
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Line/Connection logic board addressing register U17. 
1.73 PCB Interface Failure 
U17 
Failure prevents addressing and control of EPS 
switches. 
1.74 Loss of+5 V from PCB to 
Battery Control 
1.75 P/S Contingency 
Redundancy Failure 
A failure of one +5 Volt power supply could cause the 
failure of the redundant power supply. 
1.76 P/S "A" Failure Failure of one +5 Volt power supply. 
1.77 P/S "B" Failure Failure of the redundant +5 Volt power supply. 
1.78 PCB Failure PCB failure causing loss of +5 Volt bus to a 
subsystem or component. 
1.79 Interconnection Failure PCB connection failure from bus to respective 
subsystem. 
1.80 Blown/Faulty Fuse Each +5 Volt power supply are fused at the input to 
regulating circuit. 
1.81 Input Filter Failure The +5 Volt power supply contains an input filter 
from the raw bus to the regulating circuits. 
1.82 Output Filter Failure There is a common +5 Volt output filter from the 
power supplies to the +5 Volt power bus. 
1.83 Master Current Sensor 
Failure 
Current sensor located between launch switches and 
raw power bus.   Failure could prevent power from 
any source to be distributed to the loads. 
1.84 Loss of+5 V from PCB No power from the +5 Volt bus to the low threshold 
detector circuit, forcing the detector output low. 
1.85 Low Threshold Detector 
Fails Low 
Detector failing low would prevent resetting WDT. 
1.86 Broken Connection (PCB) PCB cable failure preventing power distribution to 
other subsystems. 
1.87 PCB Interface Failure 
(U17) 
See 1.73 
1.88 PCB Bus/Connection 
Fault 
Loss of command signaling to EPS components due 
to bus or connection failure. 
1.89 PCB Interface "U18" 
Failure 
This is a command signal register. Failure would also 
prevent resetting WDT. 
1.90 Loss of +5 V from PCB to 
PCB Interface Ckts 
No power from +5 Volt bus to PCB interface ckt on 
EPS logic board. 
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1.91 Bit Flop in Route Incorrect command signal received at signal 
destination due to a bit flop in-route. 
1.92 DCS Addressing Error Incorrect command signal address sent by DCS 
causing no (or incorrect) operations. Could be a 
critical failure. 
1.93 Logic Circuit "U21" Register failure prevents all battery operations (both 
batteries A and B). 
1.94 Logic Circuit "U22" Register failure prevents RF, TMUX, MASS, and 
antenna release power switch operations. 
1.95 Command Bus Failure 
(broken conn) 
Broken bus connection between U17 and U21 
(and/or U22) or from U21/U22 to the power 
switches. 
1.96 U32: A Failure Prevents clocking register U21. 
1.97 U20: A Failure Prevents clocking registers U21 and U22. 
1.98 U19 Failure Prevents clocking registers U21 and U22. 
1.99 U31:D Failure Prevents clocking register U22. 
1.100 U20: A Failure Prevents clocking registers U21 and U22. 
1.101 U19 Failure Prevents clocking registers U21 and U22. 
1.102 U17 Failure See 1.73 
1.103 U18 Failure See 1.89 
1.104 PCB Bus/Connection 
Fault 
Prevents command signal pass to switches if power 
from the PCB is lost the logic registers. 
1.105 U27:A Q (Pin 5) fails 
High 
Supplies signal to switch to energize DCS A 
continuously. 
1.106 U27:A Q bar (Pin 6) fails 
High 
Supplies signal to switch to energize DCS B 
continuously. 
1.107 U27:A Q (Pin 5) Fails 
Low 
Prevents signal switching to energize DCS A. 
1.108 U27:A Q bar (Pin 6) 
Fails Low 
Prevents signal switching to energize DCS B. 
1.109 Loss of +5 V from PCB to 
U27:A 
Cause U27:A outputs (Q and Q bar) to fail low, 
preventing power from being applied to either DCS A 
or DCS B. 
1.110 P/S Contingency 
Redundancy Failure 
See 1.75 
1.111 P/S "A" Failure See 1.76 
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1.112 P/S "B" Failure See 1.77 
1.113 PCB Failure See 1.78 
1.114 Interconnection Failure See 1.79 
1.115 Blown/Faulty Fuse See 1.80 
1.116 Input Filter Failure See 1.81 
1.117 Output Filter Failure See 1.82 
1.118 Loss of+5 V from PCB to 
Low Threshold Ckt 
Cause low threshold detector to fail low (see 1.85). 
1.119 PCB Broken Connection Unable to reset WDT from DCS due to PCB 
command signaling bus failure. 
1.120 PCB Interface "U18" 
Failure 
See 1.89 
1.121 Loss of +5 V from PCB to 
PCB Interface Ckts 
See 1.90 
1.122 WDT "U28" Failure U28:C failure prevents resetting WDT with DCS rese 
signal. 
1.123 WDT "U20" Failure U20:B failure prevents resetting WDT with DCS rese 
signal. 
1.124 WDT "Ul" Failure Unable to reset WDT, operating DCS remains 
powered until DCS or power failure secures power to 
the DCS. Unable to recover. 
1.125 Loss of+5 V from PCB to 
Logic Ckts 
1.126 High Threshold Detector 
(>4 Volts) 
High threshold detector signal failing high will clear 
all logic registers and U27:A, causing a loss of power 
to both DCS A and B. 
1.127 Loss of+5 V from PCB 
to Low Threshold Ckt 
See 1.118 
1.128 WDT "U27" Failure U27:A failure could secure power to one or both DCS 
subsystems. It is possible for U27:A to fail in 
condition at which both outputs fail high. This would 
both DCS subsystems to "fight" for spacecraft control 
1.129 Loss of+5 V from PCB to 
High Threshold Ckt 





Event Description Notes 
1.131 P/S "A" Failure See 1.76 
1.132 P/S "B" Failure See 1.77 
1.133 PCB Failure See 1.78 
1.134 Interconnection Failure See 1.79 
1.135 Blown/Faulty Fuse See 1.80 
1.136 Input Filter Failure See 1.81 
1.137 Output Filter Failure See 1.82 
1.138 Loss of +5 V from PCB to 
WDT Timing Ckt 
Loss of power to Ul prevents resetting WDT 
(see 1.122). 
1.250 Low Threshold Detector 
Fails Low 
See 1.85 











1 1 event CIRCLE 1.1 Experimental Current Sensor Failure 
2 1 event CIRCLE 1.7 Experimental S/P Blocking Diode Fails Open 
3 1 event CIRCLE 1.8 Experimental Panel String Broken 
4 1 event CIRCLE 1.14 Solar Panel Blocking Diode Fails Open 
5 1 event CIRCLE 1.15 Panel String Broken 
6 1 event DIAMOND 1.24 Faulty Temp Sensing System (TMUX) 
7 1 event DIAMOND 1.25 Improper Passive Thermal Control 
8 1 event DIAMOND 1.26 Insufficient Operator Action 
9 1 event DIAMOND 1.39 Battery Monitor Failure 
10 1 event DIAMOND 1.43 Current/Voltage Sensing Ckt Failure U25/U26 
11 1 event DIAMOND 1.110 P/S Contingency Redundancy Failure 
12 1 event DIAMOND 1.113 PCB Failure 
13 1 event CIRCLE 1.114 Interconnection Failure 
14 1 event CIRCLE 1.115 Blown/Faulty Fuse 
15 1 event DIAMOND 1.116 Input Filter Failure 
16 1 event DIAMOND 1.117 Output Filter Failure 
17 1 event DIAMOND 1.118 Loss of +5 V from PCB to Low Threshold Ckt 
18 1 event CIRCLE 1.250 Low Threshold Detector Fails Low 
19 1 event CIRCLE 1.119 PCB Broken Connection 
20 1 event CIRCLE 1.120 PCB Interface "U18" Failure 
21 1 event DIAMOND 1.121 Loss of +5 V from PCB to PCB Interface Ckts 
22 1 event CIRCLE 1.122 WDT "U28" Failure 
23 1 event CIRCLE 1.123 WDT "U20" Failure 
24 1 event CIRCLE 1.124 WDT "Ul" Failure 
25 1 event DIAMOND 1.125 Loss of +5 V from PCB to Logic Ckts 
26 1 event CIRCLE 1.126 High Threshold Detector (>4 Volts) 
27 1 event CIRCLE 1.128 WDT "U27" Failure 
28 1 event DIAMOND 1.129 Loss of +5 V from PCB to High Threshold Ckt 
29 1 event DIAMOND 1.138 Loss of +5 V from PCB to WDT Timing Ckt 
30 1 event DIAMOND 1.109 Loss of +5 V from PCB to U27: A 











32 1 event DIAMOND 1.84 Loss of+5 VfromPCB 
33 1 event DIAMOND 1.86 Broken Connection (PCB) 
34 1 event CIRCLE 1.87 PCB Interface Failure (U17) 
35 1 event CIRCLE 1.88 PCB Bus/Connection Fault 
36 1 event DIAMOND 1.91 Bit Flop in Route 
37 1 event DIAMOND 1.92 DCS Addressing Error 
38 1 event CIRCLE 1.93 Logic Circuit "U21" 
39 1 event CIRCLE 1.94 Logic Circuit "U22" 
40 1 event CIRCLE 1.95 Command Bus Failure (broken conn) 
41 1 event CIRCLE 1.96 U32:A Failure 
42 1 event CIRCLE 1.97 U20: A Failure 
43 1 event CIRCLE 1.98 U19 Failure 
44 1 event CIRCLE 1.99 U31:D Failure 
45 1 event CIRCLE 1.102 U17 Failure 
46 1 event CIRCLE 1.103 Ul8 Failure 
47 2 events CIRCLE 1.17 S13 Failure 
CIRCLE 1.16 SI Failed 
48 2 events CIRCLE 1.18 S14 Failure 
CIRCLE 1.16 SI Failed 
49 2 events CIRCLE 1.17 S13 Failure 
CIRCLE 1.19 S2 Failed 
50 2 events CIRCLE 1.18 S14 Failure 
CIRCLE 1.19 S2 Failed 
51 2 events CIRCLE 1.20 Batt A Cell Interconnection Broken 
CIRCLE 1.33 Batt B Cell Interconnection Broken 
52 2 events CIRCLE 1.21 Batt A Cell Internal Connection Broken 
CIRCLE 1.33 Batt B Cell Interconnection Broken 
53 2 events DIAMOND 1.22 Batt A Cell Reversal 
CIRCLE 1.33 Batt B Cell Interconnection Broken 
54 2 events DIAMOND 1.23 Batt A Plate Degradation 











55 2 events DIAMOND 1.27 Batt A Improper Charge Rates 
CIRCLE 1.33 Batt B Cell Interconnection Broken 
56 2 events CIRCLE 1.28 Substandard seal construction 
CIRCLE 1.33 Batt B Cell Interconnection Broken 
57 2 events DIAMOND 1.32 Battery "A" Current Sensor Failure 
CIRCLE 1.33 Batt B Cell Interconnection Broken 
58 2 events CIRCLE 1.20 Batt A Cell Interconnection Broken 
CIRCLE 1.34 Batt B Cell Internal Connection Broken 
59 2 events CIRCLE 1.21 Batt A Cell Internal Connection Broken 
CIRCLE 1.34 Batt B Cell Internal Connection Broken 
60 2 events DIAMOND 1.22 Batt A Cell Reversal 
CIRCLE 1.34 Batt B Cell Internal Connection Broken 
61 2 events DIAMOND 1.23 Batt A Plate Degradation 
CIRCLE 1.34 Batt B Cell Internal Connection Broken 
62 2 events DIAMOND 1.27 Batt A Improper Charge Rates 
CIRCLE 1.34 Batt B Cell Internal Connection Broken 
63 2 events CIRCLE 1.28 Substandard seal construction 
CIRCLE 1.34 Batt B Cell Internal Connection Broken 
64 2 events DIAMOND 1.32 Battery "A" Current Sensor Failure 
CIRCLE 1.34 Batt B Cell Internal Connection Broken 
65 2 events CIRCLE 1.20 Batt A Cell Interconnection Broken 
CIRCLE 1.35 Sub-standard Seal Construction 
66 2 events CIRCLE 1.21 Batt A Cell Internal Connection Broken 
CIRCLE 1.35 Sub-standard Seal Construction 
67 2 events DIAMOND 1.22 Batt A Cell Reversal 
CIRCLE 1.35 Sub-standard Seal Construction 
68 2 events DIAMOND 1.23 Batt A Plate Degradation 
CIRCLE 1.35 Sub-standard Seal Construction 
69 2 events DIAMOND 1.27 Batt A Improper Charge Rates 
CIRCLE 1.35 Sub-standard Seal Construction 











CIRCLE 1.35 Sub-standard Seal Construction 
71 2 events DIAMOND 1.32 Battery "A" Current Sensor Failure 
CIRCLE 1.35 Sub-standard Seal Construction 
72 2 events CIRCLE 1.20 Batt A Cell Interconnection Broken 
DIAMOND 1.36 Batt B Cell Reversal 
73 2 events CIRCLE 1.21 Batt A Cell Internal Connection Broken 
DIAMOND 1.36 Batt B Cell Reversal 
74 2 events DIAMOND 1.22 Batt A Cell Reversal 
DIAMOND 1.36 Batt B Cell Reversal 
75 2 events DIAMOND 1.23 Batt A Plate Degradation 
DIAMOND 1.36 Batt B Cell Reversal 
76 2 events DIAMOND 1.27 Batt A Improper Charge Rates 
DIAMOND 1.36 Batt B Cell Reversal 
77 2 events CIRCLE 1.28 Substandard seal construction 
DIAMOND 1.36 Batt B Cell Reversal 
78 2 events DIAMOND 1.32 Battery "A" Current Sensor Failure 
DIAMOND 1.36 Batt B Cell Reversal 
79 2 events CIRCLE 1.20 Batt A Cell Interconnection Broken 
DIAMOND 1.37 Batt B Plate Degradation 
80 2 events CIRCLE 1.21 Batt A Cell Internal Connection Broken 
DIAMOND 1.37 Batt B Plate Degradation 
81 2 events DIAMOND 1.22 Batt A Cell Reversal 
DIAMOND 1.37 Batt B Plate Degradation 
82 2 events DIAMOND 1.23 Batt A Plate Degradation 
DIAMOND 1.37 Batt B Plate Degradation 
83 2 events DIAMOND 1.27 Batt A Improper Charge Rates 
DIAMOND 1.37 Batt B Plate Degradation 
84 2 events CIRCLE 1.28 Substandard seal construction 
DIAMOND 1.37 Batt B Plate Degradation 
85 2 events DIAMOND 1.32 Battery "A" Current Sensor Failure 











86 2 events CIRCLE 1.20 Batt A Cell Interconnection Broken 
DIAMOND 1.38 Batt B Improper Charge Rates 
87 2 events CIRCLE 1.21 Batt A Cell Internal Connection Broken 
DIAMOND 1.38 Batt B Improper Charge Rates 
88 2 events DIAMOND 1.22 Batt A Cell Reversal 
DIAMOND 1.38 Batt B Improper Charge Rates 
89 2 events DIAMOND 1.23 Batt A Plate Degradation 
DIAMOND 1.38 Batt B Improper Charge Rates 
90 2 events DIAMOND 1.27 Batt A Improper Charge Rates 
DIAMOND 1.38 Batt B Improper Charge Rates 
91 2 events CIRCLE 1.28 Substandard seal construction 
DIAMOND 1.38 Batt B Improper Charge Rates 
92 2 events DIAMOND 1.32 Battery "A" Current Sensor Failure 
DIAMOND 1.38 Batt B Improper Charge Rates 
93 2 events CIRCLE 1.20 Batt A Cell Interconnection Broken 
DIAMOND 1.40 Battery "B" Current Sensor Failure 
94 2 events CIRCLE 1.21 Batt A Cell Internal Connection Broken 
DIAMOND 1.40 Battery "B" Current Sensor Failure 
95 2 events DIAMOND 1.22 Batt A Cell Reversal 
DIAMOND 1.40 Battery "B" Current Sensor Failure 
96 2 events DIAMOND 1.23 Batt A Plate Degradation 
DIAMOND 1.40 Battery "B" Current Sensor Failure 
97 2 events DIAMOND 1.27 Batt A Improper Charge Rates 
DIAMOND 1.40 Battery "B" Current Sensor Failure 
98 2 events CIRCLE 1.28 Substandard seal construction 
DIAMOND 1.40 Battery "B" Current Sensor Failure 
99 2 events DIAMOND 1.32 Battery "A" Current Sensor Failure 
DIAMOND 1.40 Battery "B" Current Sensor Failure 
100 2 events DIAMOND 1.112 P/S "B" Failure 
DIAMOND 1.111 P/S "A" Failure 











CIRCLE 1.105 U27:A Q (Pin 5) fails High 
102 2 events CIRCLE 1.108 U27:A Q bar (Pin 6) Fails Low 
CIRCLE 1.107 U27:A Q (Pin 5) Fails Low 
103 3 events CIRCLE 1.3 Experimental Line 1 SP Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.5 Experimental Line 2 SP Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.2 Experimental Connection Broken 
104 3 events CIRCLE 1.4 Experimental Line 1 EPS Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.5 Experimental Line 2 SP Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.2 Experimental Connection Broken 
105 3 events CIRCLE 1.3 Experimental Line 1 SP Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.6 Experimental Line 2 EPS Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.2 Experimental Connection Broken 
106 3 events CIRCLE 1.4 Experimental Line 1 EPS Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.6 Experimental Line 2 EPS Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.2 Experimental Connection Broken 
107 3 events CIRCLE 1.10 Line 1 SP Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.12 Line 2 SP Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.9 Connection Broken 
108 3 events CIRCLE 1.11 Line 1 EPS Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.12 Line 2 SP Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.9 Connection Broken 
109 3 events CIRCLE 1.10 Line 1 SP Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.13 Line 2 EPS Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.9 Connection Broken 
110 3 events CIRCLE 1.11 Line 1 EPS Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.13 Line 2 EPS Fuse Blows 
CIRCLE 1.9 Connection Broken 
111 3 events CIRCLE 1.31 Blocking Diode D20 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.30 Blocking Diode D9 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.33 Batt B Cell Interconnection Broken 











CIRCLE 1.30 Blocking Diode D9 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.34 Batt B Cell Internal Connection Broken 
113 3 events CIRCLE 1.31 Blocking Diode D20 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.30 Blocking Diode D9 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.35 Sub-standard Seal Construction 
114 3 events CIRCLE 1.31 Blocking Diode D20 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.30 Blocking Diode D9 Fails Open 
DIAMOND 1.36 Batt B Cell Reversal 
115 3 events CIRCLE 1.31 Blocking Diode D20 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.30 Blocking Diode D9 Fails Open 
DIAMOND 1.37 Batt B Plate Degradation 
116 3 events CIRCLE 1.31 Blocking Diode D20 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.30 Blocking Diode D9 Fails Open 
DIAMOND 1.38 Batt B Improper Charge Rates 
117 3 events CIRCLE 1.31 Blocking Diode D20 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.30 Blocking Diode D9 Fails Open 
DIAMOND 1.40 Battery "B" Current Sensor Failure 
118 3 events CIRCLE 1.20 Batt A Cell Interconnection Broken 
CIRCLE 1.42 Blocking Diode D28 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.41 Blocking Diode D10 Fails Open 
119 3 events CIRCLE 1.21 Batt A Cell Internal Connection Broken 
CIRCLE 1.42 Blocking Diode D28 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.41 Blocking Diode D10 Fails Open 
120 3 events DIAMOND 1.22 Batt A Cell Reversal 
CIRCLE 1.42 Blocking Diode D28 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.41 Blocking Diode D10 Fails Open 
121 3 events DIAMOND 1.23 Batt A Plate Degradation 
CIRCLE 1.42 Blocking Diode D28 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.41 Blocking Diode D10 Fails Open 
122 3 events DIAMOND 1.27 Batt A Improper Charge Rates 











CIRCLE 1.41 Blocking Diode D10 Fails Open 
123 3 events CIRCLE 1.28 Substandard seal construction 
CIRCLE 1.42 Blocking Diode D28 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.41 Blocking Diode D10 Fails Open 
124 3 events DIAMOND 1.32 Battery "A" Current Sensor Failure 
CIRCLE 1.42 Blocking Diode D28 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.41 Blocking Diode D10 Fails Open 
125 4 events CIRCLE 1.31 Blocking Diode D20 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.30 Blocking Diode D9 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.42 Blocking Diode D28 Fails Open 
CIRCLE 1.41 Blocking Diode D10 Fails Open 
Table A.2 Electrical Power Subsystem Minimum Cut Sets 
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APPENDIX B. RF SUBSYSTEM 
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
This appendix contains the raw data for the FT A of the RF subsystem. Figure B. 1 
is a block diagram of the RF subsystem and Fig. B.2 is a depiction of the antenna 
assembly. The RF failure end events are listed in table B.l with a brief description. 
Table B.2 list the minimum cut sets for the RF system generated by the FaultrEASE 
software program for the PANSAT fault tree in Appendix D. 
The minimum cut sets were generated using a direct evaluation technique employed 
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Event End Event Failure Notes 
.2.1 Broken Connection Refers to broken connection between PCB and 
PCB interface ckt 
2.2 PCB Interface Failure Failure prevents power to RF components 
2.3 P/S Contingency 
Redundancy Failure 
Refers to a of one +5 Volt power supplies 
causing a failure in the second (stand by) 
+5 Volt power supplies. This is possible with 
current design. 
2.4 P/S "A" Failure Failure of one +5 Volt power supplies 
(listed as power supply A) 
2.5 P/S "B" Failure Failure of second +5 Volt power supplies 
(listed as power supply B) 
2.6 PCB Failure Failure of PCB cabling in distribution of +5 Volt 
2.7 Interconnection Failure Failure of PCB connectors 
2.8 Blown/Faulty Fuse Failure of +5 Volt P/S input fuses 
2.9 Input Filter Failure Failure of +5 Volt P/S line filter from raw power 
bus 
2.10 Output Filter Failure Failure of +5 Volt P/S line filter to +5 Volt bus 
2.11 Conditioning Circuit Failure Conditions power for local use 
2.12 Amp #1-1 Fail RF Transmitter section amplifier 
2.13 Amp #1-2 Fail RF Transmitter section amplifier 
2.14 Amp #2-1 Fail RF Transmitter section amplifier 
2.15 Amp #2-2 Fail RF Transmitter section amplifier 
2.16 Loss of Raw Bus Power Loss of power to RF transmitter section 
2.17 RF Switch S3 Mechanical 
Failure 
Selects one of two cascaded HPA's, each of 
which contain two amplifiers 
2.18 Broken Command Signaling 
Bus to RF S3 
No command signal received at switch due to 
loss of conductivity between control signaling 
bus and the switch 
2.19 DCS Command Signaling 
Failure to RF S3 
No command signal received at switch due to 
incorrect command addressing logic 
2.20 Loss of Power to RF S3 Loss of power for the command (control) 
signaling bus from the RF PCB Interface Ckt 
2.21 DCS Addressing Error to 
RFS3 
Incorrect command signal received at switch due 
to invalid addressing logic 
2.22 Bit Flop in Route to Switch 
to RF S3 
Incorrect command signal received at switch 
due to an address or command signal bit flop 
106 
Event End Event Failure Notes 
in-route from the DCS to the switch 
2.23 Power Surge to RF S3 Incorrect command signal received at the switch 
due to a power surge on the command bus. 
2.24 RF S9 Switch Mechanical 
Failure 
Selects which DCS transmitter section the RF 
transmitter will be connected. One possible 
failure is if the switch was two fail in mid 
position 
2.25 Broken Command Signaling 
Bus to RF S9 
2.26 DCS Command Signaling 
Failure to RF S9 
2.27 Loss of Power to RF S9 
2.28 DCS Addressing Error to 
RFS9 
2.29 Bit Flop in Route to Switch 
toRFS9 
2.30 Power Surge to RF S9 
2.31 RF S2 Switch Mechanical 
Failure 
Switch selects one of two independent LNA's 
2.32 Broken Command Signaling 
Bus to RF S2 
Broken command signaling conductivity prevents 
commanding and control of switches 
2.33 DCS Command Signaling 
Failure to RF S2 
Failure of command signal from 
2.34 Loss of Power to RFS2 
2.35 DCS Addressing Error to 
RFS2 
Incorrect or inadvertent switch address sent to 
EPS logic ckt 
2.36 Bit Flop in Route to Switch 
toRFS2 
Incorrect command signal at switch control due 
to bit error in-route 
2.37 Power Surge to RF S2 
2.38 RF S2 Switch Power Failure 
2.39 LNA #1 Component Failure Failure prevents amplification of receive DSSS 
signal 
2.40 Loss of Raw Bus Power to 
LNA#1 
2.41 LNA #2 Component Failure Failure prevents amplification of receive DSSS 
signal 
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2.42 Loss of Raw Bus Power to 
LNA#2 
2.43 RF S8 Switch Mechanical 
Failure 
Switch selects which DCS will receive message 
signal 
2.44 Broken Command Signaling 
Bus to RF S8 
2.45 DCS Command Signaling 
Failure to RF S8 
2.46 Loss of Power to RFS8 
2.47 DCS Addressing Error to 
RFS8 
2.48 Bit Flop in Route to Switch 
toRFS8 
2.49 Power Surge to RF S8 
2.50 RF S4 Switch Mechanical 
Failure 
Switch routes the transmit and receive signals 
from and to the local oscillator section 
2.51 Broken Command Signaling 
Bus to RF S4 
2.52 DCS Command Signaling 
Failure to RF S4 
2.53 Loss of Power to RF S4 
2.54 DCS Addressing Error to 
RFS4 
2.55 Bit Flop in Route to Switch 
to RF S4 
2.56 Power Surge to RF S4 
2.57 High Antenna Coupling 
Impedance 
This failure is caused by high impedance of T coi 
connecting the 4 dipole antennas to the 
coaxial cable or the connection of the coaxial 
cable to the BPF 
2.58 Open Primary or Secondary 
Windings 
Failure of the impedance matching transformers 
connecting the 4 dipole antennas to the T 
connectors 
2.59 High Primary/Secondary 
Impedance 
High impedance could reject or severely 
attenuate signal 
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2.60 Antenna T-Connector 
Failure (1 of 3) 
Prevents signal transmission to and from antenna 
2.61 Broken Coax from Feed 
System to BPF 
Failure causes loss of conductivity between 
antenna and RF subsystem 
2.62 Shorted Primary to Ground Signal at antenna impedance matching 
transformers shorted to ground 
2.63 Shorted Secondary to 
Ground 
Signal at antenna impedance matching 
transformers shorted to ground 
2.64 Shorted Primary to 
Secondary 
Changes impedance coupling characteristics 
2.65 Antenna T-Connector 
Failure (1 of 3) 
2.66 Increased Pass Bandwidth Antenna BPF bandwidth increases (more noise 
passed throught BPF, lowering the signal to 
noise ratio 
2.67 Alter Pass Band 
Characteristics 
Increased noise (lower signal to noise ratio) due 
altered BPF characteristic response curve 
2.68 Increased Filter Line 
Impedance 
Signal strength decreased due to higher line 
impedance cause by BPF 
2.69 Signal Coupled to Ground Signal strength decreased due to failure in BPF 
coupling signal to ground 
2.70 Broken Signal Path (filter) Signal path broken between antenna and RF 
subsystem by BPF 
2.71 Signal Shorted to Ground Signal shorted to ground by BPF 
2.72 T/R Switch (SI) Mechanical 
Failure 
Switch select signals from either the HP A or 
LNA to the antenna 
2.73 Broken Command Signaling 
Bus to SI 
2.74 DCS Command Signaling 
Failure to S1 
2.75 Loss of Command Signaling 
Power to S1 
2.76 DCS Addressing Error to S1 
2.77 Bit Flop in Route to Switch 
to SI 
109 
Event End Event Failure Notes 
2.78 Power Surge (transient 
anomaly) to S1 
2.79 Antenna Deployment 
Hardware Circuit Failure 
2.80 Improper Control Signal Incorrect commanding signal from DCS to 
deploy the dipole antennas 
2.81 Control Signal Bus Failure Antenna deployment command signal does not 
reach deployment circuit due to command bus 
failure 
2.82 Antenna Release Heater 
Failure 
2.83 Insufficient Solar Power Power required to deploy antenna's 
2.84 Low Battery Power Power required to deploy antenna's (this may not 
be a valid failure scenerio since the battery is not 
relied upon as a power source for antenna 
deployment 
2.85 Antenna Manually Fails to 
Release 
If the antenna deployment circuit does not 
function, it is anticipated that the nylon cords 
which hold the antennas in place will eventually 
severe 
2.86 Antenna Failure (1 of 4) Antenna fails due to mechanical failure 
(e.g., broken dipole, antenna seperates from 
it's mounting, etc.) 
2.87 Antenna Grounded Antenna shorts signal to structure or system 
ground 
2.88 RF S5 Switch Mechanical 
Failure 
Switch connects a local oscillator to RF S4 
2.89 Broken Command Signaling 
Bus to RF S5 
2.90 DCS Command Signaling 
Failure to RF S5 
2.91 Loss of Power to RF S5 
2.92 DCS Addressing Error to 
RFS5 
2.93 Bit Flop in Route to Switch 
toRFS5 
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2.94 Power Surge to RF S5 
2.95 RF S6 Switch Mechanical 
Failure 
Switch connects local oscillator to RF S7 
2.96 Broken Command Signaling 
Bus to RF S6 
2.97 DCS Command Signaling 
Failure to RF S6 
2.98 Loss of Power to RF S6 
2.99 DCS Addressing Error to 
RFS6 
2.100 Bit Flop in Route to Switch 
toRFS6 
2.101 Power Surge to RF S6 
2.102 RF S7 Switch Mechanical 
Failure 
Switch connects signal to/from RF S6 to the 
respective DCS transmitter and receiver sections 
2.103 Broken Command Signaling 
Bus to RF S7 
2.104 DCS Command Signaling 
Failure to RF S7 
2.105 Loss of Power to RF S7 
2.106 DCS Addressing Error to 
RFS7 
2.107 Bit Flop in Route to Switch 
toRFS7 
2.108 Power Surge to RF S7 
2.109 Oscillator #1 Ckt Failure Upshifts and downshifts transmission freq. to IF 
2.110 Oscillator #1 Frequency 
Drift 
Frequency drift could cause rejection by 
bandpass filters or message distortion 
2.111 Mixer #1 Failure Conducts frequency upshift and downshift 
2.112 Oscillator #2 Ckt Failure Upshifts and downshifts transmission frequency 
to IF 
2.113 Oscillator #2 Frequency 
Drift 
Frequency drift could cause rejection by 
bandpass filters or message distortion 
2.114 Mixer #2 Failure Conducts frequency upshift and downshift 









Type Event Description 
1 1 event DIAMOND 2.1 Broken Connection 
2 1 event DIAMOND 2.2 PCB Interface Failure 
3 1 event DIAMOND 2.3 P/S Contingency Redundancy Failure 
4 1 event DIAMOND 2.6 PCB Failure 
5 1 event CIRCLE 2.7 Interconnection Failure 
6 1 event CIRCLE 2.8 Blown/Faulty Fuse 
7 1 event DIAMOND 2.9 Input Filter Failure 
8 1 event DIAMOND 2.10 Output Filter Failure 
9 1 event DIAMOND 2.11 Conditioning Circuit Failure 
10 1 event DIAMOND 2.16 Loss of Raw Bus Power 
11 1 event CIRCLE 2.17 RF Switch S3 Mechanical Failure 
12 1 event DIAMOND 2.18 Broken Command Signaling Bus to RF S3 
13 1 event DIAMOND 2.19 DCS Command Signaling Failure to RF S3 
14 1 event DIAMOND 2.20 Loss of Power to RF S3 
15 1 event DIAMOND 2.21 DCS Addressing Error to RF S3 
16 1 event DIAMOND 2.22 Bit Flop in Route to Switch to RF S3 
17 1 event DIAMOND 2.23 Power Surge toRFS3 
18 1 event CIRCLE 2.50 RF S4 Switch Mechanical Failure 
19 1 event DIAMOND 2.51 Broken Command Signaling Bus to RF S4 
20 1 event DIAMOND 2.52 DCS Command Signaling Failure to RF S4 
21 1 event DIAMOND 2.53 Loss of Power to RF S4 
22 1 event DIAMOND 2.54 DCS Addressing Error to RF S4 
23 1 event DIAMOND 2.55 Bit Flop in Route to Switch to RF S4 
24 1 event DIAMOND 2.56 Power Surge toRFS4 
25 1 event CIRCLE 2.24 RF S9 Switch Mechanical Failure 
26 1 event DIAMOND 2.25 Broken Command Signaling Bus to RF S9 
27 1 event DIAMOND 2.26 DCS Command Signaling Failure to RF S9 
28 1 event DIAMOND 2.27 Loss of Power to RF S9 
29 1 event DIAMOND 2.28 DCS Addressing Error to RF S9 
30 1 event DIAMOND 2.29 Bit Flop in Route to Switch to RF S9 









Type Event Description 
32 1 event DIAMOND 2.57 High Antenna Coupling Impedance 
33 1 event CIRCLE 2.58 Open Primary or Secondary Windings 
34 1 event DIAMOND 2.59 High Primary/Secondary Impedance 
35 1 event DIAMOND 2.60 Antenna T-Connector Failure (1 of 3) 
36 1 event CIRCLE 2.61 Broken Coax from Feed System to BPF 
37 1 event CIRCLE 2.62 Shorted Primary to Ground 
38 1 event CIRCLE 2.63 Shorted Secondary to Ground 
39 1 event CIRCLE 2.64 Shorted Primary to Secondary 
40 1 event CIRCLE 2.65 Antenna T-Connector Failure (lof3) 
41 1 event DIAMOND 2.66 Increased Pass Bandwidth 
42 1 event DIAMOND 2.67 Alter Pass Band Characteristics 
43 1 event DIAMOND 2.68 Increased Filter Line Impedance 
44 1 event DIAMOND 2.69 Signal Coupled to Ground 
45 1 event DIAMOND 2.70 Broken Signal Path (filter) 
46 1 event DIAMOND 2.71 Signal Shorted to Ground 
47 1 event CIRCLE 2.72 T/R Switch (SI) Mechanical Failure 
48 1 event DIAMOND 2.73 Broken Command Signaling Bus to SI 
49 1 event DIAMOND 2.74 DCS Command Signaling Failure to S1 
50 1 event DIAMOND 2.75 Loss of Command Signaling Power to SI 
51 1 event DIAMOND 2.76 DCS Addressing Error to S1 
52 1 event DIAMOND 2.77 Bit Flop in Route to Switch to S1 
53 1 event DIAMOND 2.78 Power Surge (transient anomaly) to SI 
54 1 event CIRCLE 2.86 Antenna Failure (1 of 4) 
55 1 event CIRCLE 2.87 Antenna Grounded 
56 1 event CIRCLE 2.88 RF S5 Switch Mechanical Failure 
57 1 event DIAMOND 2.89 Broken Command Signaling Bus to RF S5 
58 1 event DIAMOND 2.90 DCS Command Signaling Failure to RF S5 
59 1 event DIAMOND 2.91 Loss of Power to RF S5 
60 1 event DIAMOND 2.92 DCS Addressing Error to RF S5 
61 1 event DIAMOND 2.93 Bit Flop in Route to Switch to RF S5 









Type Event Description 
63 1 event CIRCLE 2.95 RF S6 Switch Mechanical Failure 
64 1 event DIAMOND 2.96 Broken Command Signaling Bus to RF S6 
65 1 event DIAMOND 2.97 DCS Command Signaling Failure to RF S6 
66 1 event DIAMOND 2.98 Loss of Power to RF S6 
67 1 event DIAMOND 2.99 DCS Addressing Error to RF S6 
68 1 event DIAMOND 2.100 Bit Flop in Route to Switch to RF S6 
69 1 event DIAMOND 2.101 Power Surge toRFS6 
70 1 event CIRCLE 2.102 RF S7 Switch Mechanical Failure 
71 1 event DIAMOND 2.103 Broken Command Signaling Bus to RF S7 
72 1 event DIAMOND 2.104 DCS Command Signaling Failure to RF S7 
73 1 event DIAMOND 2.105 Loss of Power to RF S7 
74 1 event DIAMOND 2.106 DCS Addressing Error to RF S7 
75 1 event DIAMOND 2.107 Bit Flop in Route to Switch to RF S7 
76 1 event DIAMOND 2.108 Power Surge toRFS7 
77 1 event CIRCLE 2.43 RF S8 Switch Mechanical Failure 
78 1 event DIAMOND 2.44 Broken Command Signaling Bus to RF S8 
79 1 event DIAMOND 2.45 DCS Command Signaling Failure to RF S8 
80 1 event DIAMOND 2.46 Loss of Power to RF S8 
81 1 event DIAMOND 2.47 DCS Addressing Error to RF S8 
82 1 event DIAMOND 2.48 Bit Flop in Route to Switch to RF S8 
83 1 event DIAMOND 2.49 Power Surge toRFS8 
84 1 event CIRCLE 2.31 RF S2 Switch Mechanical Failure 
85 1 event DIAMOND 2.32 Broken Command Signaling Bus to RF S2 
86 1 event DIAMOND 2.33 DCS Command Signaling Failure to RF S2 
87 1 event DIAMOND 2.34 Loss of Power to RF S2 
88 1 event DIAMOND 2.35 DCS Addressing Error to RF S2 
89 1 event DIAMOND 2.36 Bit Flop in Route to Switch to RF S2 
90 1 event DIAMOND 2.37 Power Surge toRFS2 
91 2 events DIAMOND 2.5 P/S "B" Failure 
DIAMOND 2.4 P/S "A" Failure 









Type Event Description 
DIAMOND 2.14 Amp #2-1 Fail 
93 2 events DIAMOND 2.13 Amp #1-2 Fail 
DIAMOND 2.14 Amp #2-1 Fail 
94 2 events DIAMOND 2.12 Amp #1-1 Fail 
DIAMOND 2.15 Amp #2-2 Fail 
95 2 events DIAMOND 2.13 Amp #1-2 Fail 
DIAMOND 2.15 Amp #2-2 Fail 
96 2 events DIAMOND 2.79 Antenna Deployment Hardware Circuit Failure 
CIRCLE 2.85 Antenna Manually Fails to Release 
97 2 events DIAMOND 2.80 Improper Control Signal 
CIRCLE 2.85 Antenna Manually Fails to Release 
98 2 events DIAMOND 2.81 Control Signal Bus Failure 
CIRCLE 2.85 Antenna Manually Fails to Release 
99 2 events CIRCLE 2.82 Antenna Release Heater Failure 
CIRCLE 2.85 Antenna Manually Fails to Release 
100 2 events DIAMOND 2.83 Insufficient Solar Power 
CIRCLE 2.85 Antenna Manually Fails to Release 
101 2 events DIAMOND 2.84 Low Battery Power 
CIRCLE 2.85 Antenna Manually Fails to Release 
102 2 events DIAMOND 2.109 Oscillator #1 Ckt Failure 
DIAMOND 2.112 Oscillator #2 Ckt Failure 
103 2 events DIAMOND 2.110 Oscillator #1 Frequency Drift 
DIAMOND 2.112 Oscillator #2 Ckt Failure 
104 2 events DIAMOND 2.111 Mixer #1 Failure 
DIAMOND 2.112 Oscillator #2 Ckt Failure 
105 2 events DIAMOND 2.109 Oscillator #1 Ckt Failure 
DIAMOND 2.113 Oscillator #2 Frequency Drift 
116 2 events DIAMOND 2.110 Oscillator #1 Frequency Drift 
DIAMOND 2.113 Oscillator #2 Frequency Drift 
107 2 events DIAMOND 2.111 Mixer #1 Failure 









Type Event Description 
108 2 events DIAMOND 2.109 Oscillator #1 Ckt Failure 
DIAMOND 2.114 Mixer #2 Failure 
109 2 events DIAMOND 2.110 Oscillator #1 Frequency Drift 
DIAMOND 2.114 Mixer #2 Failure 
110 2 events DIAMOND 2.111 Mixer #1 Failure 
DIAMOND 2.114 Mixer #2 Failure 
111 2 events DIAMOND 2.39 LNA #1 Component Failure 
DIAMOND 2.41 LNA #2 Component Failure 
112 2 events DIAMOND 2.40 Loss of Raw Bus Power to LNA #1 
DIAMOND 2.41 LNA #2 Component Failure 
113 2 events DIAMOND 2.39 LNA #1 Component Failure 
DIAMOND 2.42 Loss of Raw Bus Power to LNA #2 
114 2 events DIAMOND 2.40 Loss of Raw Bus Power to LNA #1 
DIAMOND 2.42 Loss of Raw Bus Power to LNA #2 
Table B.2 RF Subsystem Minimum Cut Sets 
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APPENDIX C. DIGITAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
This appendix contains the raw data for the FT A of the DCS. Figure C. 1 is a 
functional block diagram of the DCS. The DCS failure end events are listed in Table C. 1 
and the DCS minimum cut sets generated by the FaultrEASE software program for the 
PANSAT fault tree in Appendix D are listed in Table C.2. 
The minimum cut sets were generated using a direct evaluation technique employed 
by the software package. The basic end events were compared by their description label 
contents. There are repeated events listed for this fault tree, but each event is assumed to 
be different from the rest. This difference, however, may only be in the failure of 
conductivity between two points. For example, events 3.17 and 3.23 are both 
microprocessor (|IP) failures. The difference between the two events may be two 
different kinds of (J, P failures which could cause different failure paths. 
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Event End Event Failure Notes 
3.1 MASS A Failure Contains 4 Mbytes static RAM and 512 Kbytes of 
flash memory. Accessible from either DCS. 
3.2 MASS B Failure Contains 4 Mbytes static RAM and 512 Kbytes of 
flash memory. Accessible from either DCS. 
3.3 DCS A Interface Ckt 
(PCB) Failure 
Regulates power from raw power bus for the DCS 
ckt. 
3.4 DCS A uP Failure Commanding and processing unit for the spacecraft 
3.5 DCS A ED AC Failure Failure may cause inability to read from RAM or 
incorrect data transfer. 
3.6 DCS A uP RAM Failure Limits or prevents uP operations 
3.7 DCS A uP ROM Failure Failure cause inability to load base operating 
system 
3.8 PCB Failure to DCS A PCB Interface ckt failure 
3.9 Peripheral Function All peripheral sub-system functioning 
3.10 Digital Control Ckt Failure Logic conductivity between uP and SCC to the 
modem board 
3.11 Loss of Raw Bus Power 
from PCB to DCS A 
No power for DCS 
3.12 PCB Interface Failure to 
DCS A 
Unable to communicate with peripheral 
subsystems and/or loss of power for DCS 
3.13 DCS A SC Logic Board 
Power Conditioner 
Failure 
Loss of regulated power for DCS 
3.14 DCS A Local Oscillator 
(70 MHz) Failure 
Freq. modulation to/from IF 
3.15 DCS A Transmitter Mixer 
Failure 
Failure result in inability to frequency shift 
transmission data from baseband to IF 
3.16 DCS A 70 MHz 
Transmitter Output Band 
Pass Filter (BPF) 
Failure could reject, distort, or attenuate 
transmission data stream to RF subsystem. 
3.17 DCS A uP Failure see 3.4 
3.18 DCS A ED AC Failure see 3.5 
3.19 DCS A uP RAM Failure see 3.6 
3.20 DCS A uP ROM Failure see 3.7 
3.21 DCS A PA 100 Failure prevents demodulation of received message 
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PARAMAX Failure information 
3.22 DCS A SCC Failure Failure prevents message data communication 
between the uP and modem board 
3.23 DCS A uP Failure see 3.4 
3.24 Message Signal from RF 
Subsystem to DCS A 
This is a normal event, not a failure event. 
3.25 DCS A In-phase 1.5 MHz 
Cut-off Freq. Filter 
Failure 
In-phase Bandpass Filter (base band) 
3.26 DCS A In-phase Signal 
Buffer Failure 
Buffers incoming bit stream for in-phase signal. 
Failure could prevent signal flow or lost data. 
3.27 DCS A In-phase A/D 
Failure 
Analog to Digital conversion of received in-phase 
baseband signal 
3.28 DCS A 70 MHz Input 
Bandpass Filter Failure 
Failure could reject, distort, or attenuate the 
received analog IF data message from RF 
subsystem 
3.29 DCS A Input Automatic 
Gain Control (AGC) 
Failure 
Failure could prevent signal flow or incorrect 
PARAMAX demodulation 
3.30 DCS A 70 MHz Receiver 
Local Oscillator 
Failure would prevent frequency downshift from IF 
to baseband. 
3.31 DCS A Power Divider 
Failure 
Failure could prevent local oscillator signal to 
mixer, therefore no frequency downshift 
3.32 DCS A Quad Ckt Input 
Mixer Failure 
Failure would prevent frequency downshift to 
baseband for quadrature phase signal 
3.33 DCS A In-phase Ckt Input 
Mixer Failure 
Failure would prevent in-phase message 
demodulation. 
3.34 DCS A Receiver Input 
Signal Power Divider 
see 3.31 
3.35 DCS A Quad. 1.5 MHz 
Cut-off Freq. Filter 
Failure 
Quadrature phase Bandpass Filter (base band) 
3.36 DCS A Quad. Signal 
Buffer Failure 
Buffers incoming bit stream for quadrature signal. 
Failure could prevent signal flow or lost data. 
3.37 DCS A Quad. A/D Failure Analog to Digital conversion of received 
quadrature phase baseband signal 
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3.38 DCS B Interface Ckt 
(PCB) Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.39 DCS B uP Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.40 DCS B EDAC Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.41 DCS B uP RAM Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.42 DCS B uP ROM Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.43 PCB Failure to DCS B Same as for DCS A above 
3.44 DCS B Digital Control 
Ckt Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.45 Loss of Raw Bus Power 
from PCB to DCS B 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.46 PCB Interface Failure to 
DCSB 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.47 DCSB Logic Board 
Power Conditioner 
Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.48 DCS B Local Oscillator 
(70 MHz) Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.49 DCS B Transmitter Mixer 
Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.50 DCS B 70 MHz 
Transmitter Output Band 
Pass Filter (BPF) 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.51 DCS B uP Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.52 DCS B EDAC Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.53 DCS B uP RAM Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.54 DCS B uP ROM Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.55 DCS B PA 100 
PARAMAX Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.56 DCS B SCC Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.57 DCS B uP Failure Same as for DCS A above 
3.58 Message Signal from RF 
Subsystem to DCS B 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.59 DCS Bin-phase 1.5 MHz Same as for DCS A above 
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Cut-off Freq. Filter 
Failure 
3.60 DCS B In-phase Signal 
Buffer Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.61 DCS B In-phase A/D 
Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.62 DCS B 70 MHz Input 
Bandpass Filter Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.63 DCS B Input Automatic 
Gain Control (AGC) 
Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.64 DCS B 70 MHz Receiver 
Local Oscillator 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.65 DCS B Power Divider 
Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.66 DCS B Quad Ckt Input 
Mixer Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.67 DCS B In-phase Ckt Input 
Mixer Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.68 DCS B Receiver Input 
Signal Power Divider 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.69 DCS B Quad. 1.5 MHz 
Cut-off Freq. Filter 
Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.70 DCS B Quad. Signal 
Buffer Failure 
Same as for DCS A above 
3.71 DCS B Quad. A/D Failure Same as for DCS A above 
Table C.1 Digital Control System Critical Failure Events 
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Cut     Cut       Event    Event                         Description 
Set     Set        Type 
Size 
1 1 event DIAMOND 3.3 DCS A Interface Ckt (PCB) Failure 
2 1 event DIAMOND 3.4 DCS A uP Failure 
3 1 event DIAMOND 3.5 DCS A EDAC Failure 
4 1 event DIAMOND 3.6 DCS A uP RAM Failure 
5 1 event DIAMOND 3.7 DCS A uP ROM Failure 
6 1 event DIAMOND 3.8 PCB Failure to DCS A 
7 1 event DIAMOND 3.10 DCS A Digital Control Ckt Failure 
8 1 event DIAMOND 3.11 Loss of Raw Bus Power from PCB to DCS A 
9 1 event DIAMOND 3.12 PCB Interface Failure to DCS A 
10 1 event DIAMOND 3.13 DCS A SC Logic Board Power Conditioner 
Failure 
11 1 event DIAMOND 3.14 DCS A Local Oscillator (70 MHz) Failure 
12 1 event DIAMOND 3.15 DCS A Transmitter Mixer Failure 
13 1 event DIAMOND 3.16 DCS A 70 MHz Transmitter Output Band Pass 
Filter (BPF) 
14 1 event DIAMOND 3.21 DCS A PA 100 PARAMAX Failure 
15 1 event DIAMOND 3.22 DCS A SCC Failure 
16 1 event DIAMOND 3.25 DCS A In-phase 1.5 MHz Cut-off Freq. Filter 
Failure 
17 1 event DIAMOND 3.26 DCS A In-phase Signal Buffer Failure 
18 1 event DIAMOND 3.27 DCS A In-phase A/D Failure 
19 1 event DIAMOND 3.28 DCS A 70 MHz Input Bandpass Filter Failure 
20 1 event DIAMOND 3.29 DCS A Input Automatic Gain Control (AGC) 
Failure 
21 1 event CIRCLE 3.31 DCS A Power Divider Failure 
22 1 event CIRCLE 3.32 DCS A Quad Ckt Input Mixer Failure 
23 1 event CIRCLE 3.33 DCS A In-phase Ckt Input Mixer Failure 
24 1 event CIRCLE 3.34 DCS A Receiver Input Signal Power Divider 
25 1 event DIAMOND 3.35 DCS A Quad. 1.5 MHz Cut-off Freq. Filter 
Failure 
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Cut     Cut       Event    Event                          Description 
Set     Set        Type 
Size 
26 1 event DIAMOND 3.36 DCS A Quad. Signal Buffer Failure 
27 1 event DIAMOND 3.37 DCS A Quad. A/D Failure 
28 1 event DIAMOND 3.38 DCS B Interface Ckt (PCB) Failure 
29 1 event DIAMOND 3.39 DCS B uP Failure 
30 1 event DIAMOND 3.40 ODCS B ED AC Failure 
31 1 event DIAMOND 3.41 DCS B uP RAM Failure 
32 1 event DIAMOND 3.42 DCS B uP ROM Failure 
33 1 event DIAMOND 3.43 PCB Failure to DCS B 
34 1 event DIAMOND 3.44 DCS B Digital Control Ckt Failure 
35 1 event DIAMOND 3.45 Loss of Raw Bus Power from PCB to DCS B 
36 1 event DIAMOND 3.46 PCB Interface Failure to DCS B 
37 1 event DIAMOND 3.47 DSC B Logic Board Power Conditioner Failure 
38 1 event DIAMOND 3.48 DCS B Local Oscillator (70 MHz) Failure 
39 1 event DIAMOND 3.49 DCS B Transmitter Mixer Failure 
40 1 event DIAMOND 3.50 DCS B 70 MHz Transmitter Output Band Pass 
Filter (BPF) 
41 1 event DIAMOND 3.55 DCS B PA 100 PAR AM AX Failure 
42 1 event DIAMOND 3.56 DCS B SCC Failure 
43 1 event DIAMOND 3.59 DCS B In-phase 1.5 MHz Cut-off Freq. Filter 
Failure 
44 1 event DIAMOND 3.60 DCS B In-phase Signal Buffer Failure 
45 1 event DIAMOND 3.61 DCS B In-phase A/D Failure 
46 1 event DIAMOND 3.62 DCS B 70 MHz Input Bandpass Filter Failure 
47 1 event DIAMOND 3.63 DCS B Input Automatic Gain Control (AGC) 
Failure 
48 1 event CIRCLE 3.65 DCS B Power Divider Failure 
49 1 event CIRCLE 3.66 DCS B Quad Ckt Input Mixer Failure 
50 1 event CIRCLE 3.67 DCS B In-phase Ckt Input Mixer Failure 
51 1 event CIRCLE 3.68 DCS B Receiver Input Signal Power Divider 
124 
Min   Min. 
Cut     Cut       Event    Event                          Description 
Set      Set        Type 
Size 
52 1 event DIAMOND 3.69 DCS B Quad. 1.5 MHz Cut-off Freq. Filter 
Failure 
53 1 event DIAMOND 3.70 DCS B Quad. Signal Buffer Failure 
54 1 event DIAMOND 3.71 DCS B Quad. A/D Failure 
55 2 events DIAMOND 3.2 MASS B Failure 
DIAMOND 3.1 MASS A Failure 
Table C.2 DCS Minimum Cut Sets 
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APPENDIX D. PANSAT FAULT TREE 
This appendix contains the PANSAT fault tree constructed using the FaultrEASE 
software program. The small triangle end events (called transfers) denote the 
continuation of the fault tree on a following page. The letter inside the transfer symbol 
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